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Abstract
The agricultural sector in Zambia is supported through the government use of public
expenditure programs to spur the production and subsidize the consumption of key grains
to stabilize prices. Previous research has documented the effects of public spending on
agriculture in terms of food prices and food security. The effects of government
spending on the trade of key grains, however, is not well understood. As such, there is a
gap in knowledge regarding the impact of agricultural policy on the agricultural trade.
The purpose of this study was to determine the impact of Zambian agricultural policy on
grain trade. A combination of 2 trust-based theories formed the theoretical foundation of
this study. These theories included ecology of games theory and Kingdon’s garbage-can
model. Secondary data were acquired from the Food and Agriculture Organization
Corporate Statistical Database and Michigan State University. A vector autoregression
analysis of time-series data covering a 10-year period from 2003 to 2012 showed that
grain quantities purchased by the Food Reserve Agency significantly impacted grain
trade (p = 0.000), whereas the Farmer Input Subsidy Program did not significantly impact
grain trade (p = 0.843). However, the combined effect of these 2 policy instruments was
found to be statistically significant (p = 0.000). The key finding of this study is that for
every 1 metric ton purchased by the Food Reserve Agency, grain trade increases by 0.342
metric tons; whereas for every 1 Kwacha spent on Farmer Input Subsidy Program, grain
trade decreases by 0.187 metric tons. Positive social change may be achieved through
recommendations to policy makers to increase appropriations to postharvest management
and extension to increase tradable volumes and farmers’ income.
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1
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
Agriculture is the economic sector that provides food and income to the poor and
the rich all over the world (Fischer & Qaim, 2012). Agriculture is also the main source
of employment for the majority of rural poor people, especially in sub-Saharan Africa,
where this sector employs “60% of the economically active population” (Meijerink &
Roza, 2007, p. 4). Agriculture and its allied industries play an important role in the
livelihoods of people in developing economies, and their multiplier effects spur growth
“in the non-farm economy” (Meijerink & Roza, 2007, p. 15). In addition, agriculture
constitutes an important part of most African countries’ gross domestic product (Omigie
et al., 2013). The crucial role that the agricultural sector plays in sustaining livelihoods
and maintaining social and economic order has attracted the attention of policy and
decision makers in the public and private sectors. As many African governments continue
to classify agricultural production and marketing in the domain of public goods, private
sector operators look for ways to increase investment and make money in this sector. In
recent years, the real and potential growth of the agricultural sector have attracted local
public and private investments and led to “a surge of direct foreign investment in
developing country agriculture” (Hallam, 2009, p. 2).
However, the search for optimal levels of food production and marketing
sometimes put governments and the business community on a collision course. Through
agricultural policy, governments decide on the “trade-off between consumer and
producer interests” (Thomson, 2013, p. 20). Moreover, governments must decide on the
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right mix of private and public investments in agriculture. There is still no consensus on
the level and type of government spending that would foster private-sector-led
agricultural development; nevertheless, Omigie et al. (2013) found a positive relationship
between government spending and investment in agriculture.
African governments support their agricultural sector through input subsidies,
government grain purchases, and trade restriction (Druilhe & Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012). The
objectives of these policy instruments rotate around “increasing the production of key
agricultural commodities, stabilizing prices, ensuring food security, and reducing
poverty” (Druilhe & Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012, p. 19).
The application of these policy instruments has had both positive and negative
impact on the agricultural sector and its different actors such as farmers, input dealers,
and grain traders. Subsidies are credited with having increased agricultural production
and stabilized food prices in some African and many Asian countries (Odozi &
Omonona, 2012). However, in some instances, subsidies have had negative effects on the
performance of agribusinesses. Subsidies programs that were designed and implemented
without the participation of the private sector had crowding-out effects on private sector
investments (Druilhe & Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012).
Governments face a challenge of designing and implementing business-friendly
agricultural subsidy programs. The use of vouchers redeemable at private sector input
outlets has been viewed as an appropriate solution that can contribute to the development
of private-sector entities involved in input businesses (Banful, 2011). Instruments that
would crowd in agribusinesses involved in the output market are still are still
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underdeveloped in Africa. These instruments include the use of commodity exchange
which is an efficient price discovery mechanism, contract farming that ensures that
farmers have access to inputs, and agricultural insurance schemes that enable producers
to minimize their risk exposure (Demeke et al., 2012; Odozi & Omonona, 2012).
The key assumption in the agricultural sector is that production-enhancing policy
instruments increase tradable volumes, whereas price stabilization measures may produce
negative effects on grain traders’ profits (Druilhe & Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012; Jayne &
Boughton, 2011; Kodamaya, 2011). However, the combined effect of both productionenhancing and price-stabilizing instruments on grain trading has not been studied.
To contribute to the policy debate about government intervention in agriculture
and its effects on key constituencies, I conducted a study on the impact of the Zambian
agricultural policy on grain trade. This study investigated the relationship between the
Zambian government’s main agricultural policy instruments and grain trade. The key
instruments of the Zambian agricultural policy include subsidies for agricultural inputs
and government spending on grain purchases for its food reserve. Investigation into the
impact of these instruments on grain trade provided insights for public policy makers on
whether the existing dispensations and practices have enabling or debilitating effects on
international grain trade. The findings of this study may inform subsequent policy
decisions that Zambian government officials make to achieve the goal of building a
private-sector-led agricultural sector (Tembo, Chapoto, Jayne, & Weber, 2009).
This chapter provides information on the study background through the lens of
agricultural political economy in Zambia, a description of the problem under study, and
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the purpose of this research. This chapter also contains a discussion of the theoretical
underpinnings of the study, its variables, limitations, delimitation, assumptions, and its
contribution to positive social change.
Background to the Study
The agricultural sector employs one third of Africans and sustains the livelihood
of 70% of rural dwellers (Bates & Block, 2013). Meijerink and Roza (2007) estimated
that “in Sub-Saharan Africa, 60% of economically active population works in the
agricultural sector” (p. 4). The importance of this sector pushes African governments to
protect it from potentially debilitating competition. Agricultural subsidies constitute the
main policy instruments that governments use to support the agricultural sector (Ellis &
Maliro, 2013). The main policy objectives of agricultural subsidies include addressing
market failure that prevents farmers from recouping their investments in agriculture,
increase crop production, and strengthen political loyalty of the farming community
(Banful, 2011; Bates, 2013; Reichert, 2006).
Agricultural subsidies target both agricultural input and output markets. The
combination of yield-enhancing technologies and price stability contributed to the
transformation of the agricultural sector in Asia and Africa (Odozi & Omonona, 2012).
However, in Africa, agricultural subsidies often lead to market distortion and crowd out
private sector investments in the agricultural sector (Ciaian, Pokrivcak & Szegenyova,
2012; Dorward, 2009). This situation led to mistrust between government and privatesector agribusiness operators. In addition, government interference prevents producers
and buyers from creating long-term and trust-based business relationships (Tadesse &
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Shively, 2013). In fact, African agricultural markets function as “flea markets” in which
there are no trust-based relationships between producers and buyers (Tadesse & Shively,
2013, p. 1172). The dearth of “repeated transactions” between traders and farmers
amplifies market failure and leads to “frequent government interference” (Tadesse &
Shively, 2013, p. 1173).
The trust between private- and public-sector actors is the sine qua non of
inclusive and broad-based agricultural growth, as it ensures predictability in the
agricultural marketplace (Jayne & Boughton, 2011). However, “in recent years the
agribusiness community has increasingly been viewed as a major cause of social,
environment, and economic problems” (Porter & Kramer, 2011, p. 1). This perception
has contributed to increased government intervention in key economic sectors such as
agriculture. In fact, McMichael (2013) advocated for the transformation of “debt
relations” between agribusiness and farmers into “public subsidy relations” to avoid
private-sector exploitation of African farmers (p. 697).
In addition to shielding farmers against price instability and high production cost,
political interests influence government intervention in directing the allocation of
resources or factors of production (Zahariadis, 2005). Acemoglu and Robinson (2013)
suggested that even though “market failure” should be the main guiding hand for
government intervention, policy analysts and makers should not ignore “political
equilibrium” for a successful implementation of any policy proposal (pp.189-190).
Moreover, trade reforms that promote private investments into the agricultural sector do
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not guarantee the reduction of “extreme poverty” (Bussolo, De Hoyos & Medvedev,
2011, p. 2041; Duygan & Bump, 2007).
Dorosh and Mellor (2013) disagreed with the notion that increased investment in
agriculture did little to reduce poverty. They argued that it takes a long time for the
growth of the agricultural sector to have an impact on poverty levels because agricultural
growth works through prices and employment. These authors insisted that in open
economies, agricultural production has little effect on domestic prices and could be the
driving force for the development of other sectors. They basic assumption is that massive
numbers of farmers with spending capacity can spur growth in nonfarming sectors of the
economy (Jayne & Boughton, 2011). Barret (2008) also asserted that growth in the
agricultural sector has assumed reduced importance in a country’s gross domestic
product, leading to farmers’ “migration out of agriculture” to other sectors with higher
labor productivity (p. 300).
Until recently, agricultural finance was an area reserved for the public sector in
most African countries. The creation of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture
Development Program (CAADP) rekindled African governments’ commitments to
agricultural investments, and the 2007-2008 food crisis prompted private agribusinesses
to increase their investment in agriculture (Dorosh & Mellor, 2013, p. 429). Grain traders
and processors have better access to finance than farmers do, so their interest in out
grower schemes and other input financing schemes may spur an increase in agricultural
production and lead to poverty reduction (McMichael, 2013). However, government
agricultural subsidy policies may crowd out private-sector investments because of the
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lack of transparency and predictability of government policy (Jayne, Chapoto, &
Chamberlin, 2011).
The government of Zambia invests heavily in grain production and marketing
because grains are the staple food for human consumption and animal feed. In 1990s, the
government of Zambia embraced a free market economy and privatized many stateowned enterprises (Hansen, 2010). To continue its economic reform, the government
“stopped subsidizing the production and consumption of maize” in 1991, a decision that
led to high agricultural commodity prices and subsequent food riots threatening to
overthrow the government (Chapoto, 2012, p. 3; Poulton, 2014). In order to avoid food
shortages and high prices for staple foods, the government of Zambia decided to create
the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) in 1995, and it has continued to subsidize grain
production and consumption ever since (Dorward, 2009; Kuteya & Jayne, 2012). The
government tried to solve supply side problems by providing subsidized agricultural
inputs to farmers. Government subsidies to the agricultural sector “cover price and
production risks” and aim to increase the production of staple foods, mainly maize, and
reduce the retail price of maize meal (Odozi & Omonona, 2012, p. 96). The inception of
FRA was geared toward solving demand problems by providing a guaranteed market for
farmers’ produce and stabilizing agricultural prices, whereas the main goal of the Farmer
Input Support Program (FISP) was to increase production, ensure food security, and
achieve poverty reduction (Mason, Jayne, & Mofya-Mukuka, 2013).
The combined impact of these input and price stabilization subsidies on
international grain trade in Zambia has not been investigated. This study fills a gap in the
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existing literature on the intervention of the Zambian government in the agricultural
sector. Most studies in this area have focused on the impact of Zambian government
policies on agricultural production, food prices, and poverty reduction (Chirwa &
Dorward, 2013; Jayne & Rashid, 2013; Lunduka, Ricker-Gilbert, & Fisher, 2013; Mason,
Jayne, & Mofya-Mukuka, 2013). There are no studies that have addressed the
relationship between government agricultural policy and volumes of grain imports and
exports.
This study provides an empirical basis for trust building between grain traders and
the government of Zambia. Trust between these two main actors in the Zambian grain
value chain has the potential to create synergy, improve the allocation of resources, and
promote the adoption of an appropriate mix of agricultural policy that improves the
performance of the agricultural sector (Yang & Wang, 2013).
Problem Statement
The agricultural sector is the main source of income, food security, and nutrition
for the Zambian people. Sustainable and broad-based growth of the agricultural sector
requires efficient markets and a policy environment that is conducive to private-sector
investment (Jayne & Boughton, 2011). In fact, stated objectives of the Zambian
agricultural policy for the period 2010-2015 included “the reduction of production and
marketing distortions of maize” and “facilitating the growth of the private sector”
(Tembo, Chapoto, Jayne, & Weber, 2009, p. 60). Despite these promarket intentions, the
government of Zambia continued to intervene in the agricultural sector through public
expenditure and regulatory instruments.
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Input subsidies and food price stabilization policies did not result in the
production of food surpluses in sub-Saharan Africa (Galtier, 2013). In fact, “a large
proportion of smallholder farmers are only buyers or net buyers of the main staple grains”
(p. 75). Mason and Myers (2011) estimated that nearly 50% of Zambian smallholder
farmers are net buyers of maize.
This tepid performance of the agricultural sector in countries that spent a lot of
money on input subsidies and price stabilization prompted the recommendation to use
market-based solutions. Demeke, Dawe, Tefft, Ferede, and Bell (2012) recommended the
use of instruments such as warehouse receipt systems, commodity-exchange-related
contracts such as spot prices and forward contracts, as well as futures and options to
stabilize prices and strengthen price discovery mechanisms. However, opponents of
market-based instruments argue that “price volatility is an inherent” characteristic of
agricultural markets due “market failure” and missing market opportunities (Bell, Dawe,
Demeke, Ferede, Tefft, 2012, p. 5). They argue that governments should intervene to set
up food reserves and use their fiscal policy to stabilize prices. Abbot (2010) argued that
governments should coordinate their policy actions with the private sector, and that
government intervention should be rule-based, transparent, credible, and predictable to
minimize negative effects or loss of livelihood.
Barret (2008) recommended the combination of public policy instruments and
private-sector investment to enable farmers to produce “marketable surplus” (p. 300).
Galtier (2013) argued that any government intervention or subsidy can be “non-targeted”
or “targeted,” depending on whether policy objectives are meant to protect the consumer
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or the farmer (p. 77). Input subsidies in Africa tend to be targeted, whereas price
stabilization efforts become nontargeted (Mason & Ricker-Gilbert, 2012). In any case,
governments should ensure that their subsidies are temporary, solving market failure, and
do not have a negative impact on private-sector companies participating in input or
output markets (Banful, 2011; Gilbert, 2011).
The impact of Zambian agricultural policy instruments on grain trade has not been
ascertained yet. All of the research on the government agricultural policy and spending
has focused on the impact that subsidies had on rural poverty, food prices, and production
levels (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013; Jayne & Rashid, 2013; Lunduka, Ricker-Gilbert, &
Fisher, 2013; Mason, Jayne, & Mofya-Mukuka, 2013). So far, there has been no study to
determine the effects that Zambia’s agricultural subsidies and other agricultural policy
instruments such as the export ban, tax expenditures, trade tariffs, and price stabilization
had on the trade of key grains. The lack of clarity on this issue is both an economic and a
social problem that may affect sustainable development of the agricultural sector and the
livelihoods of the Zambian people. Abbott (2010) noted that although researchers and
policy analysts recommended the “coexistence of both public and private trade,” the roles
of each of these grain market players had not been delineated (p. 45). A clear
understanding of how and to what extent actions and policies of these actors in grain
markets affect each other’s performance must precede the definition of roles and trigger
events that can lead to government intervention (Gilbert, 2011). This study begins to fill
this gap by clarifying the effect of Zambian agricultural policy instruments on grain trade
volumes.
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this quantitative study is to determine the impact of Zambian
agricultural policy on grain trade. Studies on Zambian agricultural policy have focused
on food production, food prices, and poverty reduction (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013; Jayne
& Rashid, 2013; Lunduka, Ricker-Gilbert, & Fisher, 2013; Mason, Jayne, & MofyaMukuka, 2013). It is evident that the intervention of the Zambian government in key
grain markets resulted in a “paranoia effect” (Abbink, Jayne, & Moller, 2011, p. 226).
The fear of losing money due to government intervention reduced the involvement of
grain traders in the production and marketing of agricultural commodities. On the other
hand, the fear of private-sector dominance and the potential for loss of farmers’
livelihoods increased government spending on both upstream and downstream activities
of agricultural value chains (Jayne & Moller, 2011).
Trust between governments and private- sector operators “may promote
entrepreneurial activities and spur growth and development” (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2011, p.
344). However, the extent to which the private sector is affected by the instruments that
the government of Zambia uses to influence the grain markets has not been studied.
This study was conducted to detect causal relationships between government
spending on input subsidies, government grain purchases, and combined volumes of
grain imports and exports. The study used two independent variables: government
spending on input subsidies and the quantity of government grain purchases through its
Food Reserve Agency. The dependent variable was the combination of export and import
volumes of key grains.
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Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research questions influence the design of a study and “focus the purpose of the
study,” whereas hypotheses show the “predictions the researcher makes about the
expected relationships among variables” (Creswell, 2009, p. 132). This study investigated
the impact of the Zambian agricultural policy on grain trade. It sought to answer and test
the following research questions and hypotheses:
Research Question 1 (RQ1): What is the impact of the Zambian food reserve
agency’s purchases on grain trade?
Null Hypothesis 1 (H01): The Zambian food reserve agency’s purchases
do not significantly impact grain trade.
Alternative Hypothesis 1 (H1): The Zambian food reserve agency’s
purchases significantly impact grain trade.
Research Question 2 (RQ2): What is the impact of government spending on input
subsidies on grain trade?
Null Hypothesis 1 (H01): Government spending on input subsidies does
not significantly impact grain trade.
Alternative Hypothesis 1 (H1): Government spending on input subsidies
significantly impacts grain trade.
I gathered secondary data about the main policy instruments, including the
government’s grain purchases and spending input subsidies. I ran a time-series analysis
to investigate the causal relationship between these policy instruments and grain trade.
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Data on grain trade included imports and exports of key grains such as maize and rice.
All of these data are available from secondary sources.
Theoretical Framework
Researchers use theoretical frameworks to place their research studies in context
as they seek to establish congruence between concepts and observations. FrankfortNachmias and Nachmias (2008) asserted that theoretical systems enable researchers to
explain and predict phenomena through empirical research. I used a combination of trustbased theories to explain and predict the effects of the Zambian agricultural policy on
grain trade. These theories included ecology of games theory and the Kingdon garbagecan model.
Ecology of Games Theory
This theory was developed by Norton E. Long in 1958. It addresses the
interaction between institutions, also referred to as games, that pursue different interests,
and how “players in each game make use of players in the others for their particular
purposes” (Long, 1958, p. 251).
The prevailing wisdom is that collaboration between institutions reduces
transaction cost and maximizes policy outcome. Scholars in the policy arena refer to this
collaboration as “institutional rational choice” and define it as “inclusive decision
processes that bring together multiple stakeholders, [and] help build networks and trust
(Lubell, McCoy, & Henry, 2010, pp. 287-288). However, the “ecology of games theory”
suggests that collaboration between institutions may increase transaction costs as it
introduces “a new game overlaid on” the existing policy and institutional configuration
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(p. 290). Policy games are defined as “arenas of competition and cooperation structured
by a set of rules and assumptions about how to act in order to achieve a particular set of
objectives” (Lubell et al., 2010, p. 289). Using this theory, Long (1958) distinguished
governance polity as a “more contrived artifact” and the economy that can function even
when unplanned (p. 251).
The paradigm of competition and cooperation between the activities of the
agribusiness sector and government socioeconomic policies contributes to the analysis of
trust-related issues among Zambian grain industry players. In fact, Abbink, Jayne, and
Moller (2011) argued that the lack of trust between the private sector and the agricultural
policies of the government of Zambia produced a “paranoia effect” that tends to crowd
out private-sector agricultural trade and amplify government intervention (p. 3). The
authors argued that this situation tends to increase the level of public spending on the
agricultural sector, as the government fears the eventuality of food insecurity if the sector
is left to other players.
The ecology of games theory also indicates that collaborative institutions may be
trapped in the formulation of symbolic policies that are geared to simply “quell political
discontent” (Lubell et al., 2010, p. 291). In addition, due to the effects of “institutional
rational choice,” political survival strategies can direct government spending to areas
where other institutions can serve more efficiently (Araral, 2009, p. 867). Bates and
Block (2013) concluded that electoral competition led to an increase in agricultural
growth in African countries and influenced a policy shift from urban-bias to rural bias.
However, they did not investigate the effects of this shift on agribusinesses (Bates &
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Block, 2013, p. 373). Experts argue that public policies create winners and losers as
governments struggle to strike the right balance between equity and efficiency (Hyman,
2014). Porter and Kramer (2011) addressed this policy dilemma by promoting “the
concept of shared value,” which reflects an assumption that policy trust leads to more
value creation and higher public benefits than government spending alone (p. 66). This
concept makes a case for inclusive business practice and partnerships between the private
and public sectors.
Kingdon Garbage Can Model
Politicians and public administrators develop and implement public policies in a
complex environment. In addition to different streams such as problem, politics, and
policy streams, there is a myriad of stakeholders with divergent goals that make the
policy formulation process an “organized anarchy” (Kingdon, 2011, pp. 84-86).
The Kingdon garbage can model helps in framing and contextualizing the
Zambian government’s intervention in the agricultural sector. This model also helps in
analyzing and interpreting the impact that government spending has on other “policy
games,” including trust between agribusinesses and government agencies (Lubell et al.,
2010, p. 289).
I collected secondary data on grain trade in Zambia and investigated the
relationship between grain trade volumes and government agricultural spending levels,
focusing on input subsidies and grain reserve. This research provides additional empirical
evidence that explains and predicts the indirect effects of the theory of trust in the
agricultural policy domain.

16
Nature of the Study
To fill the gaps identified above, I conducted a time-series study to investigate the
impact of the Zambian agricultural policy on combined grain import and export volumes.
The study had two independent variables: the quantity of government grain purchases for
its food reserve agency and government spending on input subsidies. Grain purchases
were measured in metric tons, whereas government spending on input subsidies was
measured in monetary terms using the Zambian Kwacha. The study also had one
dependent variable that consisted of grain trade volumes combining volumes of grain
importation and exportation. The dependent variable was measured in metric tons and
focused on key grains, including maize and rice.
I used secondary data that were published by the Zambian Central Statistical
Office (CSO) and Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), as
well as Michigan State University. The data covered a 10-year period from 2003 to 2013.
I used multivariate time series analysis to analyze these time-series data. Vector
autoregressive analysis enabled the assessment of causal relationships between the
variables of this study.
Variables and Operational Definitions
Below are operational definitions of the key variables that I sought to measure
and analyze in this research:
Grain Trade
Grain trading is a step in the agricultural value chain that fulfills the function of
moving grains from areas of surplus to areas of deficit as dictated by the market

17
fundamentals of supply and demand (Odozi, 2015). Grain traders “play a central role in
the decisions that producers make about what to grow, where and how, in what
quantities, and for which markets” (, Burch, Clapp, & Murphy, 2012, p. 10). The
Zambian grain is traded at both domestic and international markets. The government of
Zambia controls the supply and demand of grain at the domestic marketplace. The
government uses both input subsidies and grain purchasing to influence market forces
and deal with the dilemma of ensuring that food remains affordable in urban centers
while maintaining incentives for rural farmers to continue the production of key grains
(Bates & Block, 2013).
Agricultural trade is usually measured as export plus imports (Brigham, 2011).
Zambia uses two policy choices to influence the international agricultural trade. These
policy choices include import substitution and export promotion. It is evident that
increased export boosts the growth of the Zambian economy (Chimfwembe &
Seshamani, 2014). This research focused on international grain trade and used data on
import and export of key grains, including maize and rice.
Food Reserve
Governments intervene in the grain market through the creation of strategic grain
reserve (Mason & Myers, 2013). The main goal of food reserves is to “overcome supply
shortage in markets as a result of harvest failures or unavailability of international
supply” (Kornher, Kalkuhl, & Mujahid, 2015, p. 6). In addition, food reserves help
governments manage price volatility and keep enough stock that can be distributed to
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people affected by drought, flood, or any events that prevent them from having enough
food (Galtier, 2013).
Input Subsidy
Agricultural input subsidy is one of the mechanisms for transferring public
resources to producers in order to reduce farmers’ cost of production and encourage the
adoption of productivity-enhancing inputs such as improved seed and fertilizer (Chirwa
& Dorward, 2013). Policy objectives of agricultural input subsidies in developing
countries include “short-term private input market development, replenishment of soil
fertility, social protection for poor subsidy recipients, and national and household food
security” (p. 22).
Assumptions
Agrarian societies engage in export when they produce significant surplus. In fact,
Saverimuttu and Rempel (2004) analyzed the determinants of grain imports and found
that “a policy that increased the price farmers receive for food crops, relative to the price
received for export crops, would reduce the need to import food” (p. 534). My study
assumes grain export and import quantities represent the true image of grain trade. The
government of Zambia restricts grain trade, especially exports; however, it rarely imposes
a total ban. It uses export quota to control export volumes. In general, Zambian farmers
are net buyers of grain; therefore, volumes traded on domestic markets can be misleading
as farmers sell and go back to buy the same grain from traders, who manage to store and
speculate with price increase (Mason & Myers, 2011). These dynamics transform many
smallholder farmers into net buyers because of lack of access or limited access to
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appropriate storage facilities and risks of incurring high postharvest losses (Armah &
Asante, 2006).
Scope and Delimitations
The government of Zambia uses public expenditure and trade restrictions to
achieve its agriculture-related goals. This study focused on the two public policy
instruments that the government uses: spending on agricultural input subsidies and
government purchases of grains. This means that the study did not investigate the effect
of agricultural trade restrictions in terms of an export ban or export quota.
Limitations
Grain trading, one of the economic activities that dominate the Zambian formal
and informal sector, has employed many Zambians since 2002 (Resnick & Thurlow,
2014). However, available data on imports and exports of key grains cover the formal
sector. This means that the study did not cover occasional or ad hoc, informal grain trade.
This may affect the external validity of the study, in that the extrapolation of study results
to the whole universe of grain trade may erroneous. However, the study population is
implicitly defined by the fact that time-series data assume consistency in grain trading.
This study used quantitative methods; therefore, it did not capture opinions or
interpretations of the study population. A “sequential explanatory strategy “of mixed
methods would have added qualitative data to explain what the numbers revealed
(Creswell, 2009, p. 211). Qualitative data would have enabled the study to gain insights
into causal relationships between Zambian agricultural policy instruments and external
trade volumes. A rigorous time-series analysis of data addressed these limitations. In
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addition, a political economy analysis included in the literature review helped in
dissecting the reasons behind specific annual budget allocations and grain purchases.
Significance
There has been a lot of research on the impact of agricultural subsidies on
production, productivity, and poverty in Zambia. However, the impact of the key
instruments of the Zambian agricultural policy on grain trade has not been ascertained.
The Zambian government uses input subsidies and price stabilization mechanisms to
support the development of its agricultural sector. These two instruments are supposed to
increase the volumes of grain traded. Saverimuttu and Rempel (2004) suggested that
export parity pricing boosts local production, which leads to a surplus. However,
Caracciolo, Depalo, and Macias (2014) found that Zambian agricultural policy forces the
exit of many international grain traders.
The best policy outcome makes “at least one person better off while making no
one worse off” (Mikesell, 2013, p. 22). In the grain industry, government policies may
affect farmers, traders, and consumers. This research on the impact of Zambian
agricultural policy on grain trade provided additional empirical evidence to explain and
predict the indirect effects of the theory of trust embedded in policies regulating the grain
industry in Zambia.
This study fills this gap and raises public policy makers’ awareness of the need to
consider both intended and unintended consequences during the agricultural policy
making process. The public and private sectors perform complementary functions to
improve people’s quality of life. Government policies must strike the right balance
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between equity and efficiency of the marketplace. This research contributes to the
existing literature about the appropriate role of the public sector and the private sector in
supporting key sectors of the economy such as agriculture to create value and sustain
social and economic development.
Summary
This study was designed to investigate the impact of the Zambian agricultural
policy on grain trade. The study used time-series data to detect the relationship between
grain trade and the level of government involvement in terms of spending on agricultural
subsidies as well as government grain purchases over a 10-year period.
This study bridges a gap in the existing literature by focusing on the impact that
the Zambian agricultural policy has had on grain trade. Prior research focused on how the
policy impacted the general populace, especially the poor segments of the Zambian
population.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
The growth and sustainability of the African agricultural sector depend on private
sector investments and the ability to sell agricultural commodities to high-paying export
markets. Zambia shifted its economic policy from import substitution to export
promotion to accelerate its economic growth. In fact, Chimfwembe and Seshamani
(2014) found “bidirectional causality between export and economic growth” (p. 14). This
means that export causes economic growth and, at the same time, economic growth
causes export. These authors recommended that the government of Zambia put in place
policies that promote export because their econometric analysis showed a “stronger
causality from export to economic growth” (p. 14). However, Caracciolo, Depalo, and
Macias (2014) asserted that “the unpredictability of the Zambian government policy over
the last decades has forced the exit of almost two-thirds of the major international grain
trading firms present in the country” (p. 496).
The government of Zambia has prioritized the agricultural sector and invests in
grain production and marketing. Government spending on agriculture has increased the
production of grains but has not significantly reduced poverty in Zambian rural areas (,
Burke, Jayne, Mason, & Shipekesa, 2011).
Past research has investigated the impact of Zambian agricultural policy on food
security and poverty; however, the impact of this policy on grain trade has not been
ascertained. A review of existing literature enables researchers to contextualize their
research topic and “clarify the relationship between the proposed study and previous

23
work conducted on the topic” (Rudestam & Newton, 2007, p. 62). Creswell (2009)
recommended that the literature review for quantitative studies focus on secondary data
and information “related to major independent and dependent variables” (p. 44).
This chapter provides an overview of previous research on the interaction
between government agricultural policies and the performance or livelihoods of nonstate
actors. I also discuss existing literature on agricultural policy and its instruments, as well
as the effect of Zambia’s agricultural policy mix.
Key sections of this chapter include literature on the impact of public policy, and
specifically agricultural policy; the context in which the Zambian agricultural policy was
developed; the scale of government intervention in the agricultural sector; and the
operations of grain traders. The chapter also shows gaps that exist in the research
conducted on the impact of Zambian agricultural policy.
Literature Search Strategy
Most of the articles cited in this literature review were retrieved from the Political
Science Complete databases available at the Walden University online library. Sage and
John Wiley & Sons publications feature highly in this literature review. I also used
relevant working papers, books, and reports from various institutions. The key search
words included policy, agriculture, Zambia, grain, and trade. Boolean operators that I
used to combine search words included AND, OR, and NOT. Most of the peer-reviewed
articles, books, working papers, and reports included in this review were written in the
last 5 years.
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Theoretical Foundation
Poverty and Trade Theories
Theory of poverty. There are several theories of poverty; two of these are
relevant to political and public policy arenas. These theories include “individual
deficiencies” and “social phenomena” (Bradshaw, 2006, p. 6). The design and
effectiveness of interventions to address poverty-related issues depend on the theory that
dominates the views of policy makers. Proponents of “conservative” views postulate that
individual deficiencies are the dominant cause of poverty, whereas those who ascribe to
“liberal” views point fingers at social phenomena (Bradshaw, 2006, p. 6). These views
influence the choice of antipoverty policies and programs.
The recent impressive economic growth in Mozambique epitomizes the limits of
both conservative and liberal views when considered separately. Economic growth did
not change the status of poverty significantly in Mozambique, where the agricultural
sector employs “about 80 per cent” of its population (Cunguara & Hanlon, 2012, p. 627).
Mozambican economic growth hinges on increased foreign direct investment in
“megaprojects” for the extraction of minerals, infrastructure development, and
international development aid (Cunguara & Hanlon, 2012, p. 626). Some development
partners and donors who represent the liberal theory of poverty argue that the most
effective strategy for reducing poverty is investing in “health, education, water, and
roads” (Cunguara & Hanlon, 2012, p. 634). These views led the government of
Mozambique and its donors to neglect the agriculture sector. On the other hand, Malawi
and Zambia defied development partners or donor countries and decided to initiate
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subsidy programs to shore up the agricultural sector. Rickard (2012) asserted that
“subsidies are one of the most direct ways government can protect citizens from the costs
of trade using national budgets” (p. 1181). To protect consumers from high prices of
maize meal, the Zambian Food Reserve Agency offloads its stock to millers at a
subsidized price (Kuteya & Jayne, 2012).
The cumulative and circumstantial theory combines both individual deficiencies
and social phenomena theories of poverty. The cumulative and circumstantial theory of
poverty involves the argument that “economic, political, and social distortion or
discrimination” represent the main cause of poverty and that antipoverty programs should
be complex to address this complex phenomenon (Bradshaw, 2006, p. 10). Addressing
both systemic and individual-related causes of poverty in agrarian economies requires
adequate incentives for farmers to adopted yield-enhancing technologies and access
stable markets. In fact, Cunguara and Hanlon (2012) noted that “surplus households in
northern Mozambique that have the assets and favorable conditions to produce much
more staple food for the market are discouraged from doing so by the instability of prices
and markets” (p. 626).
Political economy analysis of policy choices reveals winners and losers of policy
proposals. Taking a forward-looking approach to poverty analysis to identify “who is
likely to remain poor in the future,” governments of countries in which agriculture
employs the majority of people put in place policies that subsidize the cost of inputs for
smallholder farmers and ensure that they have guaranteed markets for their produce
(Carter & Barrett, 2006, p. 178).
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Appropriate targeting is essential for the success of subsidy programs. In Zambia,
the subsidy program increased total production but did not reduce poverty significantly
because of lack of surgical targeting (Mason, Burke, Shipekesa, & Jayne, 2011). This
study brought grain trade into the equation for reducing poverty and investigated the
impact of such subsidies on grain trade.
Theory of trade. Trade is the concept of exchanging goods and services between
entities. This study focused on international trade, which deals with the exchange of
goods and services between countries. The trade theory is built on the work of Adam
Smith, as refined by David Ricardo (Birgham, 2011). Most trade theories consider
absolute and comparative advantage as the basis for free trade among nations
(Schumacher, 2012).
Trade increases access to goods and services as it opens economic sectors. In fact,
trade openness was the basis of the rapid growth in the “South Asian Tigers” countries
(Birgham, 2011, p. 732). Chimfwembe and Seshamani (2014) found a strong relationship
between export and economic growth in Zambia. However, Abizadeh and Pandey (2009)
found that “trade openness had a small and possibly negative effect on the growth of total
factor productivity for the agricultural sector” (p. 555). This study focuses on the effect of
the Zambian agricultural policy on international grain trade.
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Conceptual Framework
Concept of Trust in the Public Policy Domain
I anchored this study on the “theory of trust” in the public policy domain (Lubell,
2007, p. 237). The concept of trust integrates two theories of public policy: the Kingdon
garbage can model and ecology of games theory.
Kingdon garbage can model. According to this model, public policies are
developed and implemented in a complex environment. In addition to different streams
such as problem, politics, and policy streams, there is a myriad of stakeholders with
divergent goals who make the policy formulation process an “organized anarchy”
(Kingdon, 2011, pp. 84-86).
The Kingdon garbage can model helped in framing and contextualizing the
Zambian government’s intervention in the agricultural sector and the political economy
of the Zambian grain market. This model also helped in analyzing the impact that
government spending had on other “policy games,” including trust between
agribusinesses and government agencies (Lubell et al., 2010, p. 289).
Ecology of games theory. This theory was developed by Norton E. Long in 1958.
It involves the interaction between institutions, also referred to as games, that pursue
different interests and how “players in each game make use of players in the others for
their particular purposes” (Long, 1958, p. 251).
The prevailing wisdom is that collaboration between institutions reduces
transaction costs and maximizes policy outcomes. Scholars in the policy arena refer to
this collaboration as “institutional rational choice” and define it as “inclusive decision
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processes that bring together multiple stakeholders, [and] help build networks and trust”
(Lubell et al., 2010, pp. 287-288). The institutional rational choice framework enables
the analysis of “incentives of actors involved, the context that influences their behavior
and the outcomes of strategic interaction among rational actors” (Araral, 2009, p. 869).
However, the “ecology of games theory” suggests that collaboration between institutions
may increase transaction costs as it introduces “a new game overlaid on” the existing
policy and institutional configuration (p. 290). Policy games are defined as “arenas of
competition and cooperation structured by a set of rules and assumptions about how to
act in order to achieve a particular set of objectives” (p. 289).
The paradigm of competition and cooperation between agribusinesses and
government socioeconomic policies contributes to the analysis of trust-related issues
among Zambian grain industry players. In fact, Abbink, Jayne, and Moller (2011) argued
that lack of trust between the private sector and the agricultural policies of the
government of Zambia produced a “paranoia effect” that tended to crowd out privatesector agricultural trade (p. 3). The authors argued that this situation also tended to
increase the level of public spending on the agricultural sector because those in the
government feared the eventuality of food insecurity if the sector were left to other
players.
Ecology of games theory indicates that collaborative institutions may be trapped
in the formulation of “symbolic policies” that are geared to simply “quell political
discontent” (Lubell et al., 2010, p. 291). In addition, political survival strategies can
direct government spending to areas where other institutions can serve more efficiently
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due to the effects of an “institutional rational choice” approach to policy making (Araral,
2009, p. 867). Bates and Block (2013) also concluded that electoral competition led to an
increase in agricultural growth in African countries and influenced the policy shift from
“urban-bias” to “rural bias” (p. 373). Bates and Block’s findings support the argument
that the development of public policies should always take into consideration “political
equilibria” even when stated policy objectives are to “remove market failure” or
“correcting distortion” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013, p. 190).
Experts argue that public policies create winners and losers as a government
struggles to strike the right balance between equity and efficiency (Hyman, 2014).
However, the “shared value” theory can help in contextualizing the assumption that
policy trust leads to more value creation and higher public benefits than government
spending alone (Porter & Kramer, 2011). This concept makes a case for inclusive
business practices and partnerships between the private and public sectors.
Key Variables and Concepts
Impact of Public Policy
Development projects and business initiatives have a hierarchy of measurements
that policy makers and investors track to ensure that a specific policy or program
achieves its goals and intended impact. Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman (2004) argued that
“impact theory” defines “the nature of the change in social conditions brought about by
program action” (p. 64). Impact represents the highest effect that a specific policy or
program has on the target group or a segment of the population. However, policy or
program evaluators also assess the relevance and efficiency of the “organizational plan
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and service utilizations plan” that the administrators use to implement policies or
programs (Rossi at al., 2004, p. 64). Policies or programs have two types of indicators
that enable evaluators to ascertain effectiveness and efficiency: impact indicators and
process indicators. These indicators enable policy makers to make informed decisions in
the process of designing, renewing, or discontinuing a particular program or policy.
Rosenbloom, Kravchuk, and Clerkin (2009) defined policy impact as “the extent
to which a policy causes change in the intended direction” (p. 349). These authors argued
that policy impact relates to the causal relationship between policy prescriptions and the
results of implementing proposed policies. Public policies may result in expected
outcomes or produce unexpected impacts on the target sector or population. Economists
and public policy analysts use the “Pareto criterion” to measure or predict the overall
impact of a policy and ensure that “at least one person is better off from a policy action
and no person is worse off” (Mikesell, 2013, p. 22).
However, most research on the impact of the Zambian agricultural policies has
focused on the effects that these policies have on the food security and poverty of the
general population, both urban and rural. None of these studies have closely looked at the
impact that policy instruments have had on the agribusiness sector, especially in the area
of grain trade. In this research, I looked at import and export data and analyzed the
relationship between these data and policy instruments that prevailed during each period
covered in this study.
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Agricultural Policy
Agricultural policy refers to “the set of government programs directly influencing
agricultural production and marketing decisions” (Casavant, Infanger & Bridges, 1999, p.
353). Agricultural policy is one of the public policy areas that impact people living in
both urban and rural settings, as well as small businesses and multinational corporations.
In fact, public policy is a tool that governments use to direct investments in different
areas of the economic and social life of their citizens. Governments use public policy to
redistribute resources and achieve equity and efficiency (Hyman, 2014; Mikesell, 2013).
In many African countries, the performance of agriculture affects the survival of
political figures due to the dominant role that agriculture plays in these countries’ social
and economic sectors (Bates & Block, 2013). The agricultural sector is the main source
of income, food security, and nutrition for the Zambian people. Therefore, the production
and marketing of agricultural commodities take center stage in Zambian social and
economic policies. The government of Zambia has prioritized this sector by using public
expenditure instruments to shore up grain production since “the early days of
independence” (Sitko & Kuteya, 2013, p. 4).
Contextualizing the Zambian Agricultural Policy
Chapoto (2012) conducted an analysis of the political economy of the food price
policy in Zambia that was consistent with Kingdon’s multiple streams agenda-setting
framework. Chapoto’s account showed the need for a “policy window” where problem,
policy, and politics converged to create an opportunity for an equitable and efficient
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agricultural policy (Kingdon, 2011, p. 165). Kingdon argued that public policies are a
product of multiple streams, including problem, politics, and policy streams.
Problem Stream
In 1990s, the government of Zambia embarked on macroeconomic reforms. To
transition from a planned economy to a market-based economic system, the government
liberalized economic activities, and privatized many state enterprises. It is in this context
that the Zambian government “stopped subsidizing the production and consumption of
maize” in 1991; a decision that led to high agricultural commodity prices and subsequent
food riots threatened to overthrow the government (Chapoto, 2012, p. 3; Poulton, 2014).
Furthermore, in order to mitigate the effect of “several drought cycles in 2004” the
government decided to diversify the agricultural portfolio rather than focusing solely on
maize (Sichoongwe, K., Mapemba, L., Tembo, G., and Ng’ong’ola, D., 2014, pp. 150151).
Policy Stream
To avoid food shortage and high prices for staple foods, the government of
Zambia decided to intervene at both upstream and downstream levels of the grain supply
chains with a major emphasis on maize. The government created the Food Reserve
Agency (FRA) in 1996 to solve demand problem by guaranteeing the market for farmers’
produce. The original mission of FRA was “hold buffer stocks and dampen price
variability”; however, the agency became a dominant player in the market and paid a
price that was above the market equilibrium (Chapoto, 2012, p. 3).
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In addition to buying farmers’ products, the government introduced subsidies for
agricultural inputs in 2002. This program started with subsidizing fertilizer and later the
government added subsidized seed. By the end of the 2012/2013 agricultural season, the
expanded range of crops benefiting from the Farmer Input Support Program (FISP)
included maize, rice, sorghum, peanuts, and cotton (Mason, Jayne, & Mofya-Mukuka,
2013).
Politics Stream
During an election year, politicians tend to promise an increase in public
expenditure on agricultural subsidies. In fact, the government of Zambia scaled up the
input subsidy program in 2008 following the election of President Banda and spent
unprecedented amount of money on FISP in 2011 - an election year. Mason and RickerGilbert (2013) analyzed the distribution and targeting of the FISP program and found that
from 1991 to 2011, constituencies that voted for the ruling party received more inputs
than others as a token of appreciation for their votes.
Election as a Policy Window
In unitary states, elections can predict the governance and policy options as
presidential majority in legislative bodies and their allies or satellite parties endorse most
of the ruling party policy proposals (Tewfik, 2010). This means that policy streams
(problem, policy, and politics) converge at the election time to provide a policy window
for the agenda that the governing coalition prefers. Bates and Block (2013) argued that
electoral competition led to an increase in agricultural growth in African countries and

34
influenced the policy shift from “urban bias” to “rural bias” (Bates & Block, 2013, p.
373).
However, Zambian politicians and policy makers seem to embrace a renaissance
of the premultipartism era policies that focused on keeping agricultural commodity
“prices low for urban consumers while maintaining remunerative prices for maize
producers” (Mason, Jayne, & Mofya-Mukuka, 2013, p. 4). This policy alternative may
become fiscally unsustainable in the long-run and deliberate efforts might be necessary to
attract private investments in agriculture.
Scale of the Zambian Government Intervention in Agriculture
Common policy instruments that governments use to influence the agricultural
sector include “price support, direct payments, production controls, and credit” (Bates &
Block, 2013, p. 366). Zambia uses both supply and demand side instruments to influence
the production and marketing of agricultural commodities.
Supply side policy instrument. The government of Zambia spends a significant
portion of the agricultural budget on Farmer Input Support Program (FISP) that provides
farmers with subsidized fertilizer and seed for maize, sorghum, and millet. The
government uses input subsidies to increase the overall production of staple crops and
ensure that poor smallholder farmers also participate in the agricultural production.
However, most smallholder farmers are still net buyer of key grains (Mason & Myers,
2011).
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Table 1
Zambian Government Spending on Input Subsidy Program (FISP and Food Security
Pack Program), 2003-2012 Budget Years
Budget
year

FISP (million ZMK)

2003

98050

2004

139990

2005

184050

2006

204540

2007

492080

2008

565120

2009

589010

2010

895390

2011

500000

2012*

499970

Note. Data from “Zambia’s Input Subsidy Programs,” by N. M. Mason, T. S. Jayne, and R. MofyaMukuka, 2013, Agricultural Economics, 44(2013).
* Based on budgeted amount. The budget execution takes place in the subsequent year.

Implementation of the Zambian agricultural policy focused on grain production
and consumption subsidies that crowded out private sector companies (Abbink, Jayne, &
Moller, 2011). In addition to subsidies and price support, the government uses other
policy instruments including export bans, trade tariff, and licensing to influence the
quantities that are sold in domestic and export markets. However, these other instruments
are not regular and their use depends on lobbying or fear for food shortage (Sitko &
Jayne, 2011).
Demand side policy instrument. To ensure that smallholder farmers have a
guaranteed market for their produce, the government of Zambia put in place a Food
Reserve Agency (FRA) that is primarily in charge of buying and holding a strategic food
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reserve. However, the government has been using the agency to provide smallholder
farmers with a market that pays “pan-territorial prices that frequently exceed prevailing
market prices” (Jayne & Sitko, 2014, p. 10).
Table 2
Grain Reserve Agency’s Grain Purchases
Season

FRA purchases in
metric tons

2003

54,846

2004

105,279

2005

78,666

2006

389,509

2007

396,450

2008

73,876

2009

198,629

2010

883,036

2011

1,751,660

2012
1,046,000
Note. Data from The Maize Price Spike of 2012/13: Understanding the Paradox of High Prices Despite
Abundant Supplies (p. 5), by N. Sitko and A. Kuteya, 2013, Lasaka, Zambia: Indaba Agricultural Policy
Research Institute (http://fsg.afre.msu.edu/zambia/wp81.pdf).

FRA’s practice of buying maize, rice, and cassava from farmers at a price above
the market equilibrium crowds out private sector grain traders (Chipoto, 2012). Grain
trading use market fundamentals of supply and demand to determine the price and
quantity of commodities they trade. This study clarifies the extent to which the supply
side policy instruments affect the involvement of the private sector in the Zambian grain
trading.
In addition to investigating the effect of each of these two policy instruments, this
study also investigated the combined effect of these instruments. The table below proves
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the argument that Bates and Block (2013) advanced on political and policy biases. In fact,
the data shows that in 2008, the government of Zambian more than doubled its
expenditure on Farmer Input Support Program (FISP) as the ruling party wanted to attract
rural voters. The government campaigned on “expanding the share of fertilizer it
subsidized from 60 to 75 percent” (Resnick & Thurlow, 2014, p. 14). Data for the
subsequent election cycle of 2011 suggest that the incumbent wanted to attract the rural
producer by increasing government purchases to guarantee high prices and increasing
subsidies on agricultural inputs.
Table 3
FRA Purchases and Government Spending of FISP

Year

FRA purchases in
metric tons

% change

FISP in
billion ZMK

% change

2003

54,846

98.05

2004

105,279

92%

139.99

43%

2005

78,666

-25%

184.05

31%

2006

389,509

395%

204.54

11%

2007

396,450

2%

492.08

141%

2008

73,876

-81%

565.12

15%

2009

198,629

169%

589.01

4%

2010

883,036

345%

895.39

52%

2011

1,751,660

98%

500

-44%
2012
1,046,000
-40%
499.97
-0.01%
Note. Author’s calculations using data from The Maize Price Spike of 2012/13: Understanding the Paradox
of High Prices Despite Abundant Supplies (p. 5), by N. Sitko and A. Kuteya, 2013, Lasaka, Zambia: Indaba
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (http://fsg.afre.msu.edu/zambia/wp81.pdf).

Private Sector Involvement
A sustainable growth of the agricultural sector requires efficient markets and a
policy environment that is conducive to private sector investment. Abbot (2010) argued
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that governments should coordinate their policy actions with the private sector, and that
government intervention should be rule-based, transparent, credible and predictable to
minimize negative effects or loss of livelihoods. Barret (2008) recommended the
combination of public policy instruments and private sector investment to enable farmers
to produce “marketable surplus” (p. 300). In fact, stated objectives of the Zambian
agricultural policy include “the reduction of production and marketing distortions of
maize” and “facilitating the growth of the private sector” (Tembo, Chapoto, Jayne, and
Weber, 2010, p. 60). However, “in recent years business increasingly has been viewed as
a major cause of social, environment, and economic problems” (Porter & Kramer, 2011,
p. 1). This perception led to an increased government intervention in key economic
sectors such as agriculture. In fact, McMichael (2013) advocated for the transformation
of “debt relations” between agribusiness and farmers into public subsidy relations” to
avoid private sector exploitation of African farmers (p. 697).
In Zambia, there are different categories of grain traders ranging from small-scale,
medium size and corporate traders. Small-scale traders buy grains at farm gate; thereby
saving farmers’ time and money to transport their grains to the market. Medium size and
corporate traders provide centrally located infrastructure when small- scale trader deliver
the grains they buy from smallholder farmers. Medium size and corporate traders also
offer market opportunity to farmer organizations that aggregate grains and transport truck
loads to these traders’ warehouses and other storage or aggregation facilities.
In 2014, there were more than 150 trading entities dealing in grains and members
of the Grain Traders’ Association of Zambia (GTAZ). GTAZ subdivided its members
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into three categories including corporate, medium sized and small grain traders. Studies
on the Zambian agricultural policy focused on food production, food prices, and poverty
reduction. Even though it is evident that the intervention of the Zambian government in
key grain markets resulted in a “paranoia effect” that reduced the involvement of grain
traders in the production and marketing of agricultural commodities, the effect of the
Zambian agricultural policy on grain trade has not been determined yet (p. 226).
Small traders in Zambia become profitable by “rapidly turning around stock”
(Shepherd, 2012, p. 5). Government policies may slow and accelerate grain traders’ stock
turnover; thus, affecting the volumes of grains traded on both international and internal
markets. Whereas government agencies can afford to keep high inventory levels for a
long time, grain traders must avoid storage costs and increase their stock turnover to
make money in this business whose profitability depends on volume traded.
Jayne and Sitko (2014) asserted that government procurement of grain elevate
farmers’ price expectations and crowds out traders from trading in commodities being
purchased by the government. However, the same authors showed that traders still play a
key role in the marketing of key grains especially maize in both “remote” and
“accessible” areas (p. 10).
Most corporate grain traders in Zambia target the export market. Brigham (2011)
noted that “the export of agricultural products is increasingly seen as one of the few
viable instruments for reducing hunger and poverty in the developing world” (p. 729).
This notion prompted a shift in the Zambian economic policy from import substitution to
export promotion in order to accelerate the country’s economic growth. In fact,
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Chimfwembe and Seshamani (2014) found “bidirectional causality between export and
economic growth” (p. 14). These authors recommended that the government of Zambia
put in place policies that promote export as their econometric analysis showed a “stronger
causality from export to economic growth” (p. 14). However, Caracciolo, Depalo and
Macias (2014) asserted that “the unpredictability of the Zambian government policy over
the last decades has forced the exit of almost two-thirds of the major international grain
trading firms present in the country” (p. 496).
Table 4
Rice and Maze Imports and Exports
Maize and rice imports
Maize and rice exports in
in metric tons
metric tons
Year
2003
154059
28236
2004
35143
87835
2005
59179
47220
2006
146318
28521
2007
13763
201172
2008
17208
190651
2009
52515
20343
2010
17147
59623
2011
9263
496357
2012
20616
726987
Note. Author’s calculation using FAOSTAT data.

Brigham (2011) defined international grain trade as the combination of imports
and exports of grains. The level of exports and imports is also used to measure “trade
openness” (p. 731). However, Brigham argues that the effect of imports and export
should analyzed separately as each on these components of international trade produces
different effects in different circumstances. Key considerations must include food
availability, agricultural labor productivity and the importance of agriculture in the
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economy. These considerations are important when the dependent variable is food
security or food insecurity. The dependent variable for this study is the level of
international grain trade. Therefore, the combination of key grain imports and export is
appropriate.
Table 5
Zambia’s International Grain Trade

Year

Maize
and rice
imports
in metric
tons

Maize
and rice
exports
in metric
tons

Total
international
grain trade
volumes

2003

154059

28236

182295

2004

35143

87835

122978

2005

59179

47220

106399

2006

146318

28521

174839

2007

13763

201172

214935

2008

17208

190651

207859

2009

52515

20343

72858

2010

17147

59623

76770

2011

9263

496357

505620

2012
20616
726987
747603
Note. Author’s calculation using FAOSTAT data.

Porter and Kramer (2011) urged businesses to partner with host communities to
create shared value. The creation of shared value depends on the policy environment that
must encourage wealth creation rather than redistribution of resources. Therefore,
“governments must learn how to regulate in ways that enable shared value rather than
working against it” (Porter & Kramer, 2011, p. 64). In fact, the creating shared value
theory is paradigm shift in the interaction between businesses, government and society. It
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advocates for “moving beyond trade-offs” and zero sum games that assume that
providing societal benefits means tempering with companies’ economic success (Porter
& Kramer, 2011, p. 65).
The private sector can assist farmers in adopting technologies and practices that
increase yields and the quality of produce that business buy and process. The intertwined
interest of farmers and agribusiness companies leads to a “bigger pie of revenue and
profits that benefits both farmers and companies that buy from them” (Porter & Kramer,
2011, p. 66). However, the government of Zambia invests heavily in grain purchasing.
The operations and spending of the Zambian Food Reserve Agency (FRA) have been
suspected of crowding out private sector companies that are involved in grain trading
(Gilbert, 2011).
Trust Among Policy Stakeholders
Trust is the backbone of market-based economic systems. The state and the
perception of public sector fiduciary responsibility can lead to boom or bust in the
marketplace. Successful development and implementation of public policies also depend
on the trust level between policymakers and stakeholders (Lubell, 2007). In fact, Abbink,
Jayne and Moller (2011) argue that the Bretton Woods institutions imposed liberalization
policy to African government in 1980s. These policies led to the transfer of “critical
marketing functions from state to private traders” and reinforced mistrust between
governments and private sector operators (p. 208). Policy trust theories can assist the
evaluation of the Zambian grain market performance in the current policy environment.
Relevant theoretical frameworks include generalized trust framework, transaction cost
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framework, advocacy coalition framework, policy stream framework, and creating shared
value theory.
Summary
This review of literature explored what scholars published on the Zambian
agricultural policy and its impact. The review showed that the government is involved in
both the production and marketing of agricultural commodities. The government of
Zambia uses both demand side and supply side policy instruments to influence
transactions and activities at the upstream and downstream levels of agricultural supply
chains.
Scholars who investigated the impact of the Zambian agricultural policy focused
on food security in its strict sense of food availability and the price of food. They did not
consider the impact of this policy on grain trade. This study investigated causal
relationships between applied policy instruments and the volumes of international grain
trade. The next chapter describes the methodology that this study used to collect data and
analyze the relationship between input subsidies, government grain purchases, and grain
trade in Zambia.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
This chapter describes the purpose and design of this research, the sampling
methods, and the data collection and analysis tools. The selection of any type of research
design is informed by the purpose of a study and the research questions (Creswell, 2009).
Therefore, this chapter begins with an examination of the purpose of this study.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of Zambian agricultural
policy on grain trade. Studies on Zambian agricultural policy have been focused on food
production, food prices, and poverty reduction. Studies on how key instruments of the
Zambian agricultural policy impact grain trade are lacking.
Abbink, Jayne, and Moller (2011) argued that private-sector involvement in the
grain grade and the intervention of the Zambian government in key grain markets had
resulted in a “paranoia effect” (p. 226). The fear of losing money due to government
intervention reduced the involvement of grain traders in the production and marketing of
agricultural commodities. On the other hand, the fear of private sector dominance
increased government spending on both upstream and downstream activities of
agricultural value chains. However, the effect of Zambian agricultural policy on grain
trade has not yet been determined. To fill this gap, I conducted a time-series analysis of
existing data on grain trade and government spending on input subsidies as well as grain
volumes that the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) bought over a 10-year period. Major
sections of this chapter address research design, research questions and hypotheses,
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definitions of variables and concepts, assumptions, and the methodology for data
collection and analysis.
Research Design and Rationale
This study investigated the relationship between two independent variables and
one dependent variable. The independent variables were government spending on input
subsidies and grain volumes that the government-run grain reserve agency bought over a
10-year period. It is important to note that the Zambian Food Reserve Agency always
buys grain at a price that is above the going market rate (Mulungu & Chilundika, 2016).
The dependent variable was the quantity of internationally traded grain. This variable
combined both imports and exports of key grains, including maize and rice.
This study employed a quantitative method with a time-series design that
“predicts outcomes retrospectively” (Druckman, 2004, p. 398). A time-series design and
analysis enable researchers to analyze
variation in chronological events that occur within cases referred to as diachronic
variance, focus on trends that may reveal patterns or shapes of change, compare
trends for two or more cases with the same or different number of data points, and
use regression and correlational statistics taking into account the correlations that
exist among the data points themselves, referred to as autocorrelation. (p. 398)
Wagner et al. (2002) defined a time series as “a sequence of values of a particular
measure taken at regularly spaced intervals over time” (p. 299). Moreover, Balogun,
Awaeyo, and Dawodu (2014) asserted that time series models are used “to obtain an
understanding of the underlying forces and structure that produced the observed data, and
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to fit a model and proceed to forecasting, monitoring or even feedback and feedforward
control” (pp. 1046-1047).
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research questions influence the design of a study and “focus the purpose of the
study,” whereas hypotheses show the “predictions the researcher makes about the
expected relationships among variables” (Creswell, 2009, p. 132). This study investigated
the impact of Zambian agricultural policy on grain trade. It sought to answer and test the
following research questions and hypotheses:
Research Question 1 (RQ1): What is the impact of the Zambian food reserve
agency’s purchases on grain trade?
Null Hypothesis (H0): The Zambian food reserve agency’s purchases do
not significantly impact grain trade.
Alternative Hypothesis (H1): The Zambian food reserve agency’s
purchases significantly impact grain trade.
Research Question 2 (RQ2): What is the impact of government spending on input
subsidies on grain trade?
Null Hypothesis (H0): Government spending on input subsidies does not
significantly impact grain trade.
Alternative Hypothesis (H1): Government spending on input subsidies
significantly impacts grain trade.
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Definition of Variables and Concepts
Below are operational definitions of the key variables that I sought to measure
and analyze in this research:
Grain Trade
Grain trading is a step in the agricultural value chain that fulfills the function of
moving agricultural commodities from areas of surplus to areas of deficit as dictated by
the market fundamentals of supply and demand (Odozi, 2015). Using price and volume
signals, grain traders “play a central role in the decisions that producers make about what
to grow, where and how, in what quantities, and for which markets” (Murphy, Burch, &
Clapp, 2012, p. 10). Zambian grain is traded in both domestic and export markets. The
government of Zambia controls the supply and demand of grain in the internal market.
The government uses both input subsidies and grain purchasing to influence market
forces and deal with the dilemma of ensuring that food remains affordable in urban
centers while maintaining incentives for rural farmers to continue the production of key
grains (Bates & Block, 2013). Agricultural trade flows include both exports and imports
(Brigham, 2011).
Zambia adopted two policy choices to influence the international agricultural
trade: import substitution and export promotion. It is evident that increased export boosts
the growth of the Zambian economy (Chimfwembe & Seshamani, 2014). However, the
imperatives of food security have led the government of Zambia to restrict exports of
staple crops. This research focused on international grain trade and used data on import
and export of key grains, including maize and rice.
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Food Reserve
Governments intervene in the grain market through the creation of strategic grain
reserve (Mason & Myers, 2013). The main goal of food reserves is to “overcome supply
shortage in markets as a result of harvest failures or unavailability of international
supply” (Kornher, Kalkuhl, & Mujahid, 2015, p. 6). In addition, food reserves help
governments manage price volatility and keep stock that can be distributed to people
affected by drought, flood or any event that prevents them from having enough food
(Galtier, 2013).
Input Subsidies
Agricultural input subsidies constitute one of the mechanisms for transferring
public resources to producers in order to reduce farmers’ cost of production and
encourage the adoption of productivity-enhancing input such as improved seed and
fertilizer (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013). Policy objectives of agricultural input subsidies in
developing countries include “short-term private input market development,
replenishment of soil fertility, social protection for poor subsidy recipients, and national
and household food security” (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013, p. 22).
Assumptions
Agrarian societies engage in export when they produce significant surplus. In fact,
Saverimuttu and Rempel (2004) analyzed the determinants of grain imports and found
that “a policy that increased the price farmers receive for food crops, relative to the price
received for export crops, would reduce the need to import food” (p. 534). This study
involved an assumption that grain export and import quantities represent the true image
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of grain trade. The government of Zambia restricts grain trade, especially exports;
however, it rarely imposes a total ban. From a public policy standpoint, this study reflects
policy debates that determine the expected outcome of a specific policy action. An
example of a typical policy question is “what will happen if the Federal Funds rate is
raised by 25 basis points from its current level, and kept there for two years?”
(Christiano, 2012, p. 1098). For this study, the policy question is what will happen to
grain trade if the Zambian Government changes its spending on input subsidies and the
amount of government grain purchases.
The study also involved an assumption that the linear model met is multiple
regression and the linear model not met is bootstrapped multiple regression (Field, 2013).
Another key assumption of the model is that there is no autocorrelated errors. This means
that residues are not correlated. I used the Durbin Watson test to assess whether
autocorrelations of a time series were different from zero. In addition, time series analysis
assumes that data are stationary. This means that data have the same mean, variance, and
autocorrelation over time (Adhikari & Agrawal, 2013). Heckman (2003) referred to
these properties as “the independence and invariance of the mean” (p. 74). I used the
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test to assess the stationarity of each time series.
Scope and Delimitations
The government of Zambia uses public expenditure and trade restrictions to
achieve its agriculture-related goals. This study focused on the two public policy
instruments that the government uses: spending on agricultural input subsidies and
government purchases of grains. This means that the study did not investigate the effect
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of agricultural trade restriction in terms of an export ban or export quota. These export
bans and quotas are not regular and may only last a few days or a few months, as they
depend on lobbyists’ efforts to influence “grain import tariffs and export ban for a brief
time” (Sitko & Jayne, 2011, p. 16). There may be additional factors that impact the
volume of internationally traded grains that are not necessarily in the public policy realm
or related to the two predictors of this study. Standard error of estimates account for
factors “not explained by the equation of the model” used for statistical analysis or
“uncorrelated white-noise disturbances” (Enders, 2010, pp. 5, 297).
Limitations
Grain trading, one of the economic activities that dominate the Zambian formal
and informal sector, has employed many Zambians since 2002 (Resnick & Thurlow,
2014). However, available data on import and export of key grain cover the formal
sector. This means that the study did not cover occasional or ad hoc, informal grain
traders. This may affect the external validity of the study, in that the extrapolation of
study results to the whole universe of grain traders may erroneous. However, the study
population is implicitly defined by the fact that time-series data assume consistency in
grain trading.
This study used quantitative methods; therefore, it did not capture opinions and
interpretations of the study population. A “sequential explanatory strategy “of mixed
methods would have added qualitative data to explain what the numbers revealed
(Creswell, 2009, p. 211). Qualitative data would have enabled the study to afford insights
into causal relationships between Zambian agricultural policy instruments and external

51
trade volumes. A rigorous time-series analysis of data covering a 10-year period
addressed these limitations. In addition, a political analysis included in the literature
review dissected the reasons behind specific annual budget allocations and grain
purchases.
Population and Sampling Strategy
Sampling and Sample Size
To test the impact of Zambian agricultural policy on grain trade, this study used
data covering 10 agricultural seasons from 2003 to 2012. The unit of analysis was the
country year (Zambian market measured on an annual basis). Thus, N was 10 years. I
used the entire 10-year time series, which enabled the use of standard estimation
techniques such as “linear interpolation” (Rehfeld, Marwan, Heitzig, & Kurths, 2011, p.
390).
Instrumentation
Data Collection
I used secondary data that are available from official publications, including those
of the Zambian Central Statistical Office (CSO), Food and Agriculture Organization
Corporate Statistical Database (FAOSTAT), and Michigan State University (MSU). Data
on the dependent variable, international grain trade volumes, came from FAOSTAT,
whereas data on independent variables came from government databases and other
publications, including research from Michigan State University that contained timeseries data on the Zambian food reserve agency and input subsidies. The FAOSTAT
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database is the most comprehensive and widely used for data on agriculture. The Walden
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval number was 06-06-17-0360425.
Variables. Independent variables included government spending on input
subsidies and grain volumes that the government-run grain reserve agency bought over a
10-year period. Government spending was measured in monetary terms (Zambian
Kwacha), whereas government grain purchases were measured in metric tons. The
dependent variable was the quantity of internationally traded grain. This variable
combined both imports and exports, and it was measured in metric tons.
Procedures. I used time-series data that spanned 10 agricultural seasons from
2003 to 2012. These procedures were cost effective because data were readily available
and I did not need a lot of time and financial resources to collect the data. This timeseries design advanced knowledge in the public policy arena by predicting the effect of
the Zambian agricultural policy on grain trade retrospectively (Druckman, 2004). SPSS
and Excel software could handle the analysis of causal relationship between variables.
However, I used Stata because it was required to conduct vector autoregression (VAR)
analysis.
Level of measurement. I used ratio variables that had a meaningful zero. These
variables were also continuous, in that they “can be measured at any level of precision”
(Field, 2013, p. 10). Thus, “ratio level” of measurement required statistical manipulation
for analysis (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008, p. 147). I used computer software
such as Stata and Excel “to build a model with several predictors” (Field, 2013, p. 321).
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Statistical Analysis
This study used time-series data covering 10 Zambian agricultural seasons from
2003 to 2012. Data on the dependent variable consisted of the volume of internationally
traded grains. This variable combined both import and export of the main grains,
including maize and rice. The volume of grains was expressed in metric tons. Data on
independent variables included volumes that the government of Zambia purchased for its
strategic grain reserve expressed in metric tons and the amount of money that the
government spent on input subsidies. This money was expressed in the local currency;
the Zambian Kwacha.
I conducted a time-series analysis to draw meaningful inferences from these data.
Time-series analysis is “the procedure of fitting time series data into a proper model”
(Adhikari & Agrawal, 2013, p. 15). In addition, Madsen (2008) stated that “time-series
analysis deals with statistical methods for analyzing and modelling and ordered sequence
of observations” (p. 1). Analyzing time-series data leads to understanding the underlying
structure and function that produce the observations. I used descriptive, predictive, and
prescriptive analytics to describe what happened, forecast what could happen, and advise
Zambian policy makers on how to achieve their strategic goal of building a privatesector-led agricultural sector (Tembo, Chapoto, Jayne, & Weber, 2009). Even though
time-series analysis, also referred to as time-series econometrics, was originally used for
forecasting, economists have increasingly used it “for the interpretation of economic data
and hypothesis testing” (Anders, 2010, p. 42).

54
There exist two main time-series models: univariate and multivariate (Adhikari &
Agrawal, 2013). Univariate refers to a time series that consists of one variable, whereas
multivariate time series have more than one variable. A multivariate time series that has
only two variables is termed bivariate.
Univariate time-series analysis. A univariate time series is a sequence of
measurements of the same variable collected over time at regular intervals. The
difference between a univariate time series and standard linear regression is that timeseries data are not necessarily independent or similarly distributed.
One of the key principles of data analysis is to visually inspect the data of each
variable separately to assess the variation of each variable before ascertaining the
covariation of all the variables together (Anders, 2010). I used univariate time series
analysis to observe the behavior of each variable to determine if there are any unusual
patterns that can inform subsequent analysis. This procedure also allows researchers to
distinguish “stochastic and deterministic” trends of a time series (Anders, 2010, p. 248)
Decomposition. I used the Moving Average (MA) technique to describe each
time series. MA helped with visual inspection of each variable, determining whether the
appropriate decomposition technique is additive or multiplicative, testing the appropriate
additive or multiplicative algorithm, and performing statistic tests to verify the correct
model. Using the Moving Average technique, an analyst can calculate the following:
1. Trends
2. Seasonal index
3. Regression equation
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4. Forecast future value for each of the variables (trade volumes, FRA purchases,
and government expenditure on FISP)
I used the following classic multiplicative model to get coefficient, constant and
random matrix for each variable: Y123=TCSI where
Y1 = Quantity of internationally traded Zambian grain
Y2 = Government input subsidies
Y3 = government grain purchases of its strategic reserve
T = Trend
C = Cycle
S = Seasonal effect
I = Irregular fact (noise or random variation that is unpredictable)
I used annual data; so, the time series analysis did not include S as annual data do
not have seasonal effect.
The linear model was y = b0 + b1(x1) +b2(x2) +b3(x3) +…+bk (xk) where
y = Trend line estimate of y
x = Time period
The applicable regression equation is y = a+bx

b=

n xy   x y
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Stationarity. Time-series analysis assumes that the dataset is stationary.
Stationary time series are those whose “mean and variance are constant over a given
period of time and the covariance between the two time periods does not depend on the
actual time at which it is computed but it depends only on lag amid the two time periods”
(Kumar, 2011, p. 10). Stationary series vary around a constant mean level, neither
decreasing of increasing systematically over time with constant variance. In fact,
“stationarity of a data series is a prerequisite for drawing meaningful inferences in a time
series analysis” (Kumar, 2011, p. 10).
Greene (2003) asserted that different forms of “Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests for unit
roots are an indispensable tool for the analyst of time-series data” (p. 661). I used
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to assess the stationarity of the variables because the time
series data for this study are parametric as they are ratio data, they assume a normal
distribution, homogeneous variance. The ADF null hypothesis is that the t-test is 0,
meaning that there is a unit root. When the t-test is equal to zero, the dataset must be
transformed to make it stationary. The alternative hypothesis is that the t-test is less than
zero; meaning that the dataset is stationary and does not need to be transformed.
Autocorrelation. I used the Durbin-Watson test to assess the presence of
autocorrelation. Autocorrelation refers to the relationship between a variable and itself
over period intervals, the level of a variable affects its future level.
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Multivariate time series. Multivariate time series analysis allows researchers to
model and explain the interactions and co-movements among a group of time series
variables. Multivariate analysis also enables researchers to test the effect of multiple
independent variables on the dependent variable. Multivariate analysis uses “the
technique of multiple regression” that helps researchers reflect the realities of the real life
where changes depend on many events acting together (Frankfort-Nachmias &
Nachmias, 2008, p. 403). Multiple regression analyzes the effects of multiple
independent variables on one dependent variable: y=f(x1, x2… xn).
Multivariate analysis also enables researchers to avoid caveats and conduct
comprehensive analysis of key phenomenon without conduction multiple and costly
studies to look at every angle of a social problem.
Knowing the extent to which each variable drives change or its contribution to the
change allows researchers to conduct a “utilization-focused” research and analysis
(Patton, 2002, 173-175). This type of analysis helps stakeholders use the findings to take
decisions knowing the likely “effect size” attributed to each variable and combination of
variables (Creswell, p. 157). I also assessed “the combined effect” of all the independent
variables” by “computing the “coefficient of determination” (Frankfort-Nachmias &
Nachmias, 2008, p. 403).
Covariation. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008) asserted that covariation
exists when two or more variables ‘go together’ or change together in a systematic way”
(p. 53). Covariates are referred to as predictors in time-series analysis. The main variables
for the study included a group of independent variables (predicators) consisting of key
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agricultural policy instruments such as the amount of money allocated to agricultural
input subsidies and the quantity of grains that the government of Zambia bought for the
strategic food reserve. The dependent variable consisted the volumes of international
grain trade that included both imports and exports. I used time-series data that covered
ten agricultural seasons; from 2003 to 2012.
I used “multivariate vector autoregressive model” to test the impact of the
Zambian agricultural policy instruments on grain trade (Hood III, Kidd, & Morris, 2008,
p. 326). This instrument allows appropriate sequence of time-series datasets. Multivariate
time-series are also known as vector autoregressive and the main models include Vector
Autoregressive (VAR) and Autoregressive-Moving Average (ARMA).
The basic model for this research was:
y = f(x1, x2) where
y = Quantity of internationally traded Zambian grain
x1 = Government spending on agricultural input subsidies
x2 = Quantity of grain purchased by the government’s food reserve agency
I used vector auto regression (VAR) technique to determine whether government
spending on input subsidies and the volumes that the food reserve agency buys can be
used to forecast the level of imports and exports of key grains. VAR is one of the models
for the analysis of multivariate time series. Chaiechi (2014) stated that “in addition to
data description and forecasting, the VAR model is also used for structural inference and
policy analysis” (p. 139). Stock and Watson (2001) also asserted that econometricians
use VAR models for “data description, forecasting, structural inference and policy
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analysis” (p. 101). Christopher A. Sims who introduced VAR suggested three purposes of
VAR including “forecasting economic time series, designing and evaluating economic
models, and evaluating the consequences of alternative policy actions” (Christiano, 2012,
p. 1083). VAR models provide a good fit to macroeconomic data. They are also flexible
as they “can be conditional on the potential future paths of specified variables in the
model” (Ozturk & Agan, 2014, p. 7). It has also been argued that “VAR sticks more
closely to the data than other structuralist models” (Heckman, 2000, p. 49).
The primary focus was on investigating whether or not correlation between these
two sets of variables existed. However, as Campbell and Stanley (1963) indicated,
“correlation does not necessarily indicate causation” (p. 64). Heckman (2000) insisted
that “a causal interpretation of an empirical relationship is required to evaluate economic
policies within well-specified model” (p. 46). So this study provided preliminary insights
that can be used to develop further causal hypotheses between the Zambian agricultural
policy and grain trade.
This study used one outcome variable which was continuous. It consisted of
internationally traded grain volumes. This variable combined both imports and exports of
key grains including maize and rice. I used two predictor variables including government
spending on input subsidies and the quantity of grain that the food reserve agency
purchased over a ten-year period. Field (2013) defined a continuous variable as “one that
can take any value on the measurement scale” (p. 10).
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Significance
There has been a lot of research on the impact of agricultural subsidies on the
production, productivity and poverty in Zambia. However, the impact of the key
instruments of the Zambian agricultural policy on grain trade has not been ascertained.
The Zambian government uses input subsidies and price stabilization mechanisms to
support the development of its agricultural sector. These two instruments are supposed to
increase the volumes of grain traded. Saverimuttu and Rempel (2004) suggested that
export parity pricing boosts local production which leads to a surplus. However,
Caracciolo, Depalo and Macias (2014) found that Zambian agricultural policy forces the
exit of many international grain traders.
The best policy outcome makes “at least one person better off while making no
one worse off” (Mikesell, 2013, p. 22). In the grain industry, government policies may
affect farmers, traders and consumers. This research on the impact of the Zambian
agricultural policy on grain trade provided additional empirical evidence that explain and
predict the indirect effects of the theory of trust or the lack of trust embedded in policies
regulating the grain industry in Zambia.
This study fills this gap and raises public policy makers’ awareness of the need to
consider both intended and unintended consequences during the agricultural policy
making process. Public and private sectors perform complementary functions to improve
people’s quality of life. Government policies must strike the right balance between equity
and efficiency of the marketplace. This research contributes to the existing literature
about the appropriate role of the public sector and the private sector in supporting key
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sectors of the economy such as agriculture to create value and sustain social and
economic development.
Threats to Validity
Grain traders in Zambia have different forms including farm gate grain collectors,
village level grain aggregators, small-scale traders, medium and large size corporations
that purchase and process grains. This study focused on formal grain trade as it used
import and export data. This focus did not consider informal grain trade and internal
markets. This might dilute the external validity of the study as it could be difficult to
extrapolate the findings to the entire grain trading industry. To minimize measurement
error and measure variables accurately, I used ten-year data on international grain trade.
Ethical Issues
There are no ethical issues that this study caused as it used data from secondary
sources. All the data are in the public domain and the study did not collect any views
from people who might be affected by the findings or conclusions. However, I have spent
almost ten years supporting agribusiness to source raw materials from smallholder
farmers and building the capacity of small and medium sized agribusinesses to improve
their supply chain management. So, my professional biases could be a source of potential
ethical issue. To mitigate this risk, I used rigorous statistical analysis that focused on
what the numbers revealed.
Summary
The time-series design that uses multivariate analysis enabled me to test the
effects that the two policy instruments of the Zambian agricultural policy had on grain
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trade from 2003 to 2012. Vector auto-regression technique allowed me to investigate the
causal relationships between multiple variables.
Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
This study was developed to determine the impact of Zambian agricultural policy
on international grain trade. The study was designed to answer the following research
questions:
1. What is the impact of the Zambian food reserve agency’s purchases on grain
trade?
The null hypothesis for this question was that the Zambian food reserve agency’s grain
purchases did not significantly impact grain trade, whereas the alternative hypothesis was
that the Zambian food reserve agency’s purchases significantly impacted grain trade.
2. What is the impact of government spending on input subsidies on grain trade?
The null hypothesis for this question was that government spending on input subsidies
did not significantly impact grain trade. Its alternative hypothesis was that government
spending on input subsidies significantly impacted grain trade.
This chapter contains the results of the data analysis and includes sections on data
description, assumption testing, and causality inference among variables. Descriptive
analysis was conducted to visualize trends and develop forecasting equations for each
variable; the augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test was used to assess the stationarity of
the time-series datasets; and the Durbin-Watson test helped in detecting the presence of
autocorrelation in the residuals from a regression analysis. Vector autoregression analysis
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was used to analyze causal inferences between one dependent variable and two
independent variables and answer the two research questions.
Data
This research and analysis used time-series data covering a 10-year period from
2003 to 2012, as shown in the table below. These are secondary data from publically
available sources such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, Michigan State
University, and the Government of Zambia.
Table 6
Time-Series Data

Year

FRA purchases in
metric tons

FISP in million
ZMK

Total international
grain trade volumes

2003
54846
98050
182295
2004
105279
139990
122978
2005
78666
184050
106399
2006
389509
204540
174839
2007
396450
492080
214935
2008
73876
565120
207859
2009
198629
589010
72858
2010
883036
895390
76770
2011
1751660
500000
505620
2012
1046000
499970
747603
Note. Author’s calculations using data from Sitko and Kuteya (2013) and FAOSTAT.

Data Description
In this analysis, FRA purchases are referred to as FRA, FISP spending is referred
to as FISP, and international grain trade volume is referred to as Trade. Each of these
variables has 10 observations, as shown in the data summary in Table 7.
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Table 7
Data Summary
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. dev.

Min

Max

FRA

10

497795.1

561571.5

54846

1751660

FISP

10

416820

253347

98050

895390

Trade

10

241215.6

216938.5

72858

747603

The analysis of these data focused on identifying patterns, including trends and
periodical variations (descriptive statistics); understanding and modeling the data
(explanatory statistics); and predicting trends from previous patterns (forecasting). After
summarizing the data, I started plotting observed values for each variable against time to
visualize the patterns of the data over time.
Figure 1 shows that FRA purchases almost hit rock bottom in 2008 as the
government was increasing its budgetary allocations to the Farmer Input Support
Program. Allocations to FISP started to increase more than ever right after 2008. During
this year, the country held presidential elections to replace President Levy Mwanawasa,
who died in office serving his second term.
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Figure 1. Trends in FRA grain purchases.
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Figure 2. Trends in government spending on FISP.

In 2010, government spending input subsidies for the FISP program skyrocketed
as the country headed toward elections. More spending on input subsidies symbolizes
government efforts to mobilize rural voters.
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Figure 3. Trends in grain volumes traded internationally.

In 2010, volumes of internationally traded grain bottomed. After that year, they
shot straight upward. During the same period, the other two variables experienced an
upswing movement.
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Figure 4. Covariance among variables.

Whereas FRA purchases and FISP spending declined and plateaued after 2011,
grain trade volumes continued on an upward trend.
Univariate Time-Series Analysis
After graphic representation of the data, I proceeded with univariate time-series
analysis, which is a sequence of measurements of the same variable collected over time at
regular intervals. One of the key principles of data analysis is visual inspection of the data
for each variable separately to assess the variation of each variable before ascertaining
the covariation of all the variables together (Anders, 2010). I used univariate time-series
analysis to observe the behavior of each variable to determine if there were any unusual
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patterns that could inform subsequent analysis. This procedure also allows researchers to
distinguish “stochastic and deterministic” trends of a time series (Anders, 2010, p. 248)
I used a decomposition procedure with the moving average (MA) technique to
describe each time series. MA helped with visual inspection of each variable,
determining whether the appropriate decomposition technique was additive or
multiplicative, testing the appropriate additive or multiplicative algorithm, and
performing statistical tests to verify the correct model. Using the MA technique, I was
able to calculate the following:
1. Trends
2. Seasonal index
3. Regression equation
4. Future value forecast for each of the variables (trade volumes, FRA
purchases, and government expenditure on FISP)
I used the following classic multiplicative model to get coefficient, constant, and
random matrix for each variable: y123 = TCSI, where
y1 = Government input subsidies (FISP)
y2 = Government grain purchases of its strategic reserve (FRA)
y3 = Quantity of internationally traded Zambian grain

T = Trend
C = Cycle
S = Seasonal effect

70
I = Irregular fact (noise or random variation that is unpredictable)
I used annual data, so the time-series analysis did not include S, because annual
data do not have seasonal effects.
The linear model was y = b0 + b1(x1) +b2(x2) +b3(x3) +…+bk (xk) where
y = Trend line estimate of y
x = Time period
The applicable regression equation is y = a+bx
b=

a=

n xy   x y
n x 2 

 x 
2

 y  b  x  or a =
n

 n 







y b x
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Table 8
FISP Expenditure in Millions of Zambian Kwacha

Year x code
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Sum
Mean

y
98050
139990
184050
204540
492080
565120
589010
895390
500000
499970

x
code
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
55
5.5

2-period
moving
average
119020
162020
194295
348310
528600
577065
742200
697695
499985

y

Centered
moving
average

140520
178157.5
271302.5
438455
552832.5
659632.5
719947.5
598840
Total

1.31
1.15
1.81
1.29
1.07
1.36
0.69
0.83
9.51

Mean

1.19

Xy

98050
98050
139990
279980
184050
552150
204540
818160
492080 2460400
565120 3390720
589010 4123070
895390 7163120
500000 4500000
499970 4999700
4168200 28385350
416820

The applicable equation is y = a+bx

Ratio
to MA

x2
1
4
9
16
25
36
49
64
81
100
385

Deseasonalized
FISP expenditure
82458
117728
154782
172013
413827
475252
495343
753001
420488
420463

72
b=

a=

n xy   x y
n x 2 

 x 
2

= 41

 y  b  x  or a =
n

 n 







y  b x = 416595

Below is the equation that can be used to predict future value of FISP
expenditure:
y1 = 416595 + 41x; where y1 is projected FISP expenditure and x is the nth year after
2013.
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Table 9
FRA Purchases in Metric Tons
2 -period
moving
average

Year

x code

Y

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

54846
105279
78666
389509
396450
73876
198629
883036
1751660
1046000

Sum
Mean

x
code
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
55
5.5

80063
91973
234088
392980
235163
136253
540833
1317348
1398830

Centered
moving
average

Ratio
to
MA

86018
163030
313534
314071
185708
338543
929090
1358089
Total
Mean

0.91
2.39
1.26
0.24
1.07
2.61
1.89
0.77
11.14
1.39

y

xy

x2

54846
105279
78666
389509
396450
73876
198629
883036
1751660
1046000
4977951
497795

54846
210558
235998
1558036
1982250
443256
1390403
7064288
15764940
10460000
39164575

1
4
9
16
25
36
49
64
81
100
385

The applicable equation is y = a+bx

Deseasonalized
FISP
expenditure
39398
75626
56508
279798
284784
53068
142682
634315
1258278
751378
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b=

a=

n xy   x y
n x 2 

 x 
2

= 88

 y  b  x  or a =
n

 n 







y  b x = 497309

Below is the equation that can be used to predict future value of FRA purchases:
y2= 497309+88x; where y2 is projected FRA purchases and x is the nth year after 2013.
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Table 10
International Grain Trade (Import and Export of Key Grains)

2-period
moving
average

Year

x code

y

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

1
2
3
4
5

182295
122978
106399
174839
214935

152636.5
114688.5
140619
194887

6
7
8
9
10

207859
72858
76770
505620
747603

211397
140358.5
74814
291195
626611.5

2009
2010
2011
2012

Centered
moving
average

Ratio to
MA

Deseasonalized
trade volumes

133662.5
127653.75
167753

0.80
1.37
1.28

145983
98481
85205
140012
172121

203142
175877.75
107586.25
183004.5
458903.25

1.02
0.41
0.71
2.76
1.63

166454
58345
61478
404903
598684

Sum
Average
Adjustment factor =

9.99
1.25

1.6016

x code

y

xy

x2

1

182295

182295

1

2

122978

245956

4

3

106399

319197

9

4

174839

699356

16

5

214935

1074675

25

6

207859

1247154

36

7

72858

510006

49

8

76770

614160

64

9

505620

4550580

81

10

747603

7476030

100

Sum

55

2412156

16919409

385

Mean

5.5

241216

The applicable equation is y = a+bx

Total
seasonal index
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b=

a=

n xy   x y
n x 2 

 x 
2

= 18

 y  b  x  or a =
n

 n 







y  b x = 241080

Below is the equation that can be used to predict future value of internationally
traded grain volumes:
y3=241080+18x; where y3 is projected internationally traded grain volumes and x
is the nth year after 2013.
After the above univariate analysis, I conducted an analysis of statistical
assumptions for vector autoregration analysis to ensure that this type of analysis is
appropriate for each of the variables.
Evaluation of Statistical Assumptions
There are two main assumptions for vector autoregression analysis. These include
stationarity of time series and serial correlation. Before running vector autoregressive
analysis of time-series data sets, I tested these assumptions using Augmented DickeyFuller test for the stationarity of time series and Durbin-Watson test for serial correlation.
Stationarity Test
Drawing inferences from autoregressive models becomes an issue when timeseries datasets have a unit root. Augmented Dickey- Fuller (ADF) is one of the most
popular test for unit root. The null hypothesis for this test is that the time series has a unit
root; and the alternative hypothesis is that the time series does not have a unit root.
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The test value is a negative number. When the ADF test statistic is positive, the
null hypothesis is automatically accepted and the time series is declared non-stationary
(Stadnytska, 2010 & Brooks, 2008). The key characteristic of a stationary time series is
that it’s “mean, variance, and autocorrelations can usually be well approximated by
sufficiently long time averages based on the single set of realizations” as they do not
change over time (Enders, 2010, p. 53-54).
Table 11
Augmented Dickey-Fuller

[lags]

DF-GLS tau
test statistic

1% critical
value

5% critical
value

10% critical
value

11
-2.925
-3.610
-2.763
-2.489
10
-2.671
-3.610
-2.798
-2.523
9
-2.766
-3.610
-2.832
-2.555
8
-3.259
-3.610
-2.865
-2.587
7
-3.536
-3.610
-2.898
-2.617
6
-3.115
-3.610
-2.929
-2.646
5
-3.054
-3.610
-2.958
-2.674
4
-3.016
-3.610
-2.986
-2.699
3
-2.071
-3.610
-3.012
-2.723
2
-1.675
-3.610
-3.035
-2.744
1
-1.752
-3.610
-3.055
-2.762
Note. Opt Lag (Ng-Perron seq t) = 7 with RMSE .0388771. Min SC = -6.169137 at lag 4
with RMSE .0398949. Min MAIC = -6.136371 at lag 1 with RMSE .0440319.
ADF value is normally negative. As shown in Table 11, the null hypothesis that
these time-series datasets have a unit root or are non-stationary can be rejected at 11 and
8;7;6,5; and 4 lags as they are all more negative than the DF-GLS test statistic at 5%
significance level. However, it is appropriate to use 1 lag as each variable contains annual
data.

78
Variable: Food Reserve Agency (FRA).
Table 12
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root in FRA Data
Number of obs =

8
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
1% critical
5% critical
value
value

Test
Statistic

10% critical
value

Z(t)
2.264
-4.380
-3.600
Note. MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 1.0000.

-3.240

Test statistic of 2.264 shows that this time series is not stationary. To make it
stationary, I used the following seasonally adjusted data (deseasonalized) for this
variable.
Table 13
Deseasonalized Data on FRA Purchases in Metric Tons

Year

x
code

Y

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

54846
105279
78666
389509
396450
73876
198629
883036
1751660
1046000

2-period
moving
average

Centered
moving
average

Ratio
to
MA

80063
91973
234088
392980
235163
136253
540833
1317348
1398830

86018
163030
313534
314071
185708
338543
929090
1358089

0.91
2.39
1.26
0.24
1.07
2.61
1.89
0.77

Deseasonalized
FISP
expenditure
39398
75626
56508
279798
284784
53068
142682
634315
1258278
751378
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Table 14
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root in Deseasonalized FRA Data
Number of obs =
Test
statistic

8
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
1% critical
5% critical
10% critical
value
value
value

Z(t)
-5.381
-4.380
-3.600
-3.240
Note. MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000.
ADF test conducted on deseasonalized data shows that the test statistic is -5.381
which is more negative than the critical value at 5% significance level.
Variable: Farmer Input Support Program (FISP).
Table 15
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root in FISP Data
Number of obs =

Test
statistic

8
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
1% critical
5% critical
10% critical
value
value
value

Z(t)
-4.717
-4.380
-3.600
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0007

-3.240

The test statistic is lower or more negative than the critical value. So, this time
series is stationary.
Variable: International grain trade.
Table 16
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit root in International Grain Trade Data
Number of obs =
Test

8
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
1% critical
5% critical
10% critical

80
statistic

value

value

value

Z(t)
-1.631
-4.380
-3.600
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.7800

-3.240

This time series is not stationary as the test statistic is higher or less negative than
the critical value. To make it stationary, I deseasonalized the dataset.
Table 17
Deseasonalized Data on International Grain Trade

Year
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

X
code
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Y
182295
122978
106399
174839
214935
207859
72858
76770
505620
747603

2-period
moving
average
152636.5
114688.5
140619
194887
211397
140358.5
74814
291195
626611.5

Centered
moving
average

133662.5
127653.75
167753
203142
175877.75
107586.25
183004.5
458903.25

Ratio
Deseasonalized
to
trade volumes
MA

0.80
1.37
1.28
1.02
0.41
0.71
2.76
1.63

145983
98481
85205
140012
172121
166454
58345
61478
404903
598684

Table 18
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root in Deseasonalized International Grain
Trade Data
Number of obs =
8
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
Test
1% Critical
5% Critical
10% Critical
Statistic
Value
Value
Value
Z(t)
-4.975
-4.380
-3.600
-3.240
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0002
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This time-series variable has become stationary as the test statistic value is more
than critical value at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level.
Serial Correlation Test
Serial correlation occurs in time-series when the errors associated with a given
time period carry over into future time periods. Vector autoregression analysis assumes
the absence of autocorrelation. Durbin – Watson test helps detect the presence of
autocorrelation in the residuals from a regression analysis. This test “has been found to be
quite powerful when compared to others for AR (1) processes” (Greene, 1990, p. 452).
Table 19
Durbin-Watson statistic
Source

SS

df

MS

Number of obs =
F (2,

10

7) = 3.89

Model

1.4293e+11

2

7.1465e+10

Prob > F

Residual

1.2869e+11

7

1.8385e+10

R-squared

= 0.0732
= 0.5262

Adj R-squared = 0.3908
Total

2.7162e+11

9

Trade

Coef.

Std. Err.

t

P>|t|

[95% Conf. Interval]

FRA .3478672

.1258216

2.76

0.028

.0503465

.645388

FISP -.1876164

.2003416

-0.94

0.380

-.661349

.2861162

_cons

86121.33

1.71

0.132

-56667.31

146977.3

3.0181e+10

Root MSE

= 1.4e+05

350621.9

. estat dwatson
Durbin-Watson d-statistic (3, 10) = 1.461809
The null hypothesis is that there is zero autocorrelation in the residuals and the
alternative hypothesis is that the residuals are positively autocorrelated. “The Durbin-
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Watson statistic has a distribution of 0≤ d ≤4 with value vary close to 2 indicating no
serial correlation” (Carson & Munroe, 2005, p.606). A value toward 0 indicates positive
autocorrelation, while a value toward 4 indicates negative autocorrelation. The DurbinWatson statistic of 1.462 suggests that there is zero autocorrelation in the residuals.
Therefore, at 95% level of significance, we can accept hypothesis that there is no
autocorrelation. Moreover, a regression without the intercept term shows d = 1.275.
Table 20
Durbin-Watson test in a Regression without Intercept Term
Source

SS

Model 8.9383e+10
Residual 1.8224e+11
Total

2.7162e+11

Trade
Coef.
FRA .3653054
FISP .0626333

df

MS

1
8

8.9383e+10
2.2780e+10

9

3.0181e+10

Std. Err.
.139594
.1519555

t
2.62
0.41

Number of obs = 10
F (1, 8)
= 3.92
Prob > F
= 0.0829
R-squared
= 0.3291
Adj R-squared = 0.2452
Root MSE
= 1.5e+05

P>|t|
0.031
0.691

[95% Conf. Interval]
.043401 .6872098
-.2877767 .4130434

. estat dwatson
Durbin-Watson d-statistic (2, 10) = 1.275174
The Durbin Watson significance table for 2 variables and 10 observations shows
dl: 0.466 and du: 1.333. Since 1.275 is more than the tabulated lower bound of 0.466, we
can accept the null hypothesis that there are no autocorrelated errors and conclude that
there is no first-order correlation. Even though Kmenta (1986) recommended the
following decision rules:
1. Reject if d < dL

83
2. Do not reject if d >dU
3. The test in inconclusive if dL ≤ d≤ dU
Banerjee et al. (1993) asserted that when R2 is more than the Durbin-Watson
statistic, it is an indication that there is “strong autocorrelation in the regression residuals”
(p.81). In our case, the R2 value 0.3291 which is less than the d value of 1.275. As there are
still concerns that the residuals may be serially correlated, I used Prais-Winsten estimator
to reinforce the conclusion that there is no autocorrelation.
Table 21
Prais-Winsten AR (1) regression - iterated estimates
prais Trade FRA FISP, rhotype (regress)
Iteration 0: rho = 0.0000
Iteration 1: rho = -0.1197
Iteration 2: rho = -0.1639
Iteration 3: rho = -0.1753
Iteration 4: rho = -0.1779
Iteration 5: rho = -0.1785
Iteration 6: rho = -0.1786
Iteration 7: rho = -0.1787
Iteration 8: rho = -0.1787
Iteration 9: rho = -0.1787
Iteration 10: rho = -0.1787
Source

SS

df

MS

Model 1.8735e+11
Residual 1.2760e+11

2
7

9.3673e+10
1.8228e+10

Total 3.1494e+11

9

3.4993e+10

Trade
Coef.
FRA .3629159
FISP -.1985358

Std. Err.
.1163524
.1842873

t
3.12
-1.08

Number of obs = 10
F (2, 7)
= 5.14
Prob > F
= 0.0423
R-squared
= 0.5949
Adj R-squared = 0.4791
Root MSE
= 1.4e+05

P>|t|
0.017
0.317

[95% Conf. Interval]
.0877861 .6380457
-.634306 .2372344
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_cons

141705.9

76465.46

1.85

0.106

-39106.16

322518

rho -.1786781
Durbin-Watson statistic (original) 1.461809
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 1.595201

The value of the transformed Durbin-Watson is now d=1.595 which is more that
the upper limit of dU: 1.333 and close of 2. I can now conclude that there is no serial
correlation.
Even though time series analysis, also referred to as time series econometrics, was
originally used for forecasting, economists have increasingly used it “for the
interpretation of economic data and hypothesis testing” (Anders, 2010, p. 42). I used
vector autoregression analysis to test the hypothesis underlying each research question of
this study. I used deseasonalized data for the two variables (FRA and Trade) who timeseries data had to be transformed to meet stationarity conditions.
Vector Autoregression
Vector autoregressive models are used to perform four macro-economic tasks
including “data description, forecasting structural inference, and policy analysis” (Stock
and Watson, 2001, p. 101). I used vector autogressive analysis to answer research
questions.
Table 22
Modified Data for VAR Analysis
Year
2003
2004

FRA
39398
75626

FISP
98050
139990

Trade
145983
98481

85
2005
56508
184050
85205
2006
279798
204540
140012
2007
284784
492080
172121
2008
53068
565120
166454
2009
142682
589010
58345
2010
634315
895390
61478
2011
1258278
500000
404903
2012
751378
499970
598684
Note. FRA and Trade datasets have been seasonally adjusted to meet stationarity
conditions.
Research Question 1
Research Question 1 was the following: What is the impact of the Zambian food
reserve agency’s purchases on grain trade? The Null hypothesis for this question is that
the Zambian food reserve agency’s purchases do not significantly impact grain trade. The
alternative hypothesis is that the Zambian food reserve agency’s purchases significantly
impact grain trade.
Table 23
Vector Autoregression for Research Question 1
Sample: 2004 - 2012

No. of obs

=

= 25.33268

Log likelihood

= -110.9971

AIC

FPE

= 6.04e+09

HQIC

Det (Sigma_ml)

= 3.02e+09

SBIC

9

= 25.19081
= 25.39842

Equation

Parms

RMSE

R-sq

chi2

P>chi2

Trade

3

67292.3

0.8991

80.15732

0.0000

Coef.

Std. Err.

Trade
Trade

z

P>|z|

[95% Conf. Interval]
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Trade
L1.

1.137868

.1843163

6.17

0.000

.7766148

1.499121

FRA .2996418

.0472647

6.34

0.000

.2070046

.3922789

_cons -87859.87

37444.76

-2.35

0.019

-161250.2 -14469.49

The goodness of fit between observed expected values is significant as the p value
of chi square is below 0.05. The p value is 0.0000. The result is significant at p < 0.05.
This means that the FRA purchases significantly impacts grain trade. So, null hypothesis
is rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted.
Research Question 2
Research Question 2 was the following: What is the impact of government
spending on input subsidies on grain trade? The null hypothesis for this question is that
government spending on input subsidies does not significantly impact grain trade; and the
alternative hypothesis is that government spending on input subsidies significantly
impacts grain trade.
Table 24
Vector Autoregression for Research Question 2
Sample: 2004 - 2012

No. of obs

Log likelihood = -118.6208

AIC

= 27.02685

FPE

HQIC

= 26.88498

= 3.29e+10

Det (Sigma_ml) = 1.64e+10
Equation

Parms

SBIC
RMSE

R-sq

=

9

= 27.09259
chi2

P>chi2
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Trade

3

156982

Coef.

Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

[95% Conf. Interval]

L1.

1.163747

.4299047

2.71

0.007

.3211496

FISP

.0371238

.1880317

0.20

0.843

-.3314116

.4056592

_cons

9258.806

113850.3

0.08

0.935

-213883.8

232401.4

Trade

0.4506

7.382846

0.0249

Trade
Trade
2.006345

The goodness of fit between observed expected values is significant as the p value
of chi square is below 0.05. However, the value of R2 shows that the model describes
only 45% of the variances in trade volumes.
The p value is 0.841 which is more than the critical value of 0.05. The hypothesis
that government spending on input subsidies does not significantly impact grain trade is
accepted.
Overall Research Question
The overall research question was the following: What is the impact the Zambian
agricultural policy on grain trade? The null hypothesis was that the key policy
instruments (FRA and FISP) do not significantly impact grain trade; whereas the
alternative hypothesis was that these instruments significantly impact grain trade. Below
is the analysis of the combine impact of the key policy instruments.
Table 25

88
Vector Autoregression for the Overall Research Question
Sample: 2004 - 2012
Log likelihood = -107.7513
FPE
= 3.82e+09
Det(Sigma_ml) = 1.47e+09
Equation
Trade

No. of obs
=
9
AIC
= 24.83363
HQIC
= 24.64447
SBIC
= 24.92128

Parms
4

Trade
Trade
Trade
L1.
FRA
FISP
_cons

RMSE
51396.4

R-sq
0.9509

chi2
174.4016

P>chi2
0.0000

Coef.

Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

[95% Conf. Interval]

1.139934

.1285129

8.87

0.000

.8880531

.3421253
-.1878696
-19897.25

.0357171
.0609097
34163.17

9.58
-3.08
-0.58

0.000
0.002
0.560

.2721211 .4121295
-.3072503 -.0684888
-86855.82 47061.33

Equation

Parms

Trade

4

Trade

RMSE

R-sq

chi2

1.391814

P>chi2

105855 0.7918 34.23584 0.0000

Coef.

Trade
Trade
L1. 1.113002
logFISP -161231.3
logFRA_FISP 103226.8
_cons -492861.2

Std. Err.

.2665227

z

4.18

68616.15 -2.35
27396.03
3.77
568451.3 -0.87

P>|z|

0.000
0.019
0.000
0.386

[95% Conf. Interval]

.5906273

1.635377

-295716.5 -26746.14
49531.59
156922
-1607005
621283

The goodness of fit between observed expected values is significant as the p value
of chi square is below 0.05. The model also describes 95% of data as the R2 = 0.951
which is higher than the one assigned to any of the two independent variable when
analyzed alone. This means that combined both variables improved the model.

89
Testing for the statistical significance of each independent variable (testing if the
unstandardized coefficients are equal to 0 in the population) shows that FRA variable
coefficient is statistically significant (its p value is 0.000 which is less than the critical
value of 0.05). The test also shows that FISP variable coefficient have become
statistically significant as its p value changed from 0.843 to 0.002 which is less than the
critical value of 0.05. FRA dominated the combine effect as the p value for the combine
effect is 0.000.
The analysis of combined effect of these two policy instruments suggests that
there are both significant. Unstandardized coefficients indicate how much the dependent
variable varies with an independent variable. Calculated coefficients show that for every
1 MT purchased by FRA, international grain trade increases by 0.342 MT. For every 1
Kwacha spent on Farmer Input Subsidy Program, international grain trade decreases by
0.187 MT.
Therefore, the general form of the equation to predict Zambia’s international grain
trade from the grain reserve and input subsidy programs is as follows:
Predicted grain trade (Trade) = -19897.25 + (0.342 x FRA) – (0.187 x FISP)
Forecasting Horizon
The Zambian long-term vision is to become “a prosperous middle-income nation
by 2030” with an agriculture-related goal of “an efficient, competitive, sustainable and
export led agriculture sector that assures food security and increased income by 2030”
(Weitz et al., 2015, p.9). Therefore, the forecast from 2013 to 2030 will cover 18 years.
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Figure 5 shows that grain trade volumes continue to grow if the trends and FRA
purchases and FISP spending continue.
Table 26
Forecast Levels of Grain Trade
Year

FRA

FISP

Trade

2003

39398

98050

145983

2004

75626

139990

98481

2005

56508

184050

85205

2006

279798

204540

140012

2007

284784

492080

172121

2008

53068

565120

166454

2009

142682

589010

58345

2010

634315

895390

61478

2011

1258278

500000

404903

2012

751378

499970

598684

varTrade

598684

2013

723289.8

2014

868444.8

2015

1037538

2016

1234516

2017

1463979

2018

1731284

2019

2042670

2020

2405408

2021

2827967

2022

3320210

2023

3893632

2024

4561618

2025

5339763

2026

6246235

2027

7302197

2028

8532300

2029

9965263

2030

11634541

0

5000000

1.00e+07

1.50e+07
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Figure 5. Forecast grain trade volumes.
Summary
This analysis has shown that the combined effect of the two main agricultural
policy instruments (Food Reserve Agency and Farmer Input Support Program)
significantly impact grain trade. However, the analysis of individual independent
variables showed that only the purchases of the Food Reserve Agency significantly
impact grain trade and that government spending on the Farmer Input Support Program
does not significantly impact grain trade.
The next chapter contains a discussion on the above-mentioned findings,
conclusions that can be drawn from this research and policy recommendations. The
chapter also discusses areas that need further research.

92
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to determine the impact of the Zambian agricultural
policy on grain trade. The key policy instruments that served as independent variables
included the volume of grain that the Zambian Grain Reserve Agency (FRA) purchased
from the 2002-2003 agricultural season to the 2012-2013 season and government
spending on the Farmer Input Support Program (FISP) over the same period. The
dependent variable consisted on volumes of grain imported in and exported out of
Zambia from 2003 to 2013.
This study found out that a combination of these two agricultural policy
instruments significantly impacted grain trade. The analysis also showed that for every 1
MT purchased by FRA, international grain trade increases by 0.342 MT, and that for
every 1 Zambian Kwacha spent on FISP, international grain trade decreases by 0.187
MT. However, when the impact of these variables is analyzed separately, it becomes
clear that only FRA purchases significantly impact grain trade.
Interpretation of Key Findings
The findings of this study confirm that strong coordination and cooperation
between “policy games” is crucial to the achievement of policy objectives (Lubell et al.,
2010, p. 289). Policy games are defined as “arenas of competition and cooperation
structured by a set of rules and assumptions about how to act in order to achieve a
particular set of objectives” (p. 289). The findings revealed that the combined impact of
the two policy games (i.e., FRA and FISP) on grain trade is significant; however, when
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these instruments are analyzed individually, only FRA has a significant impact. This is
because FRA sells its stocks to grain traders in preparation for new harvest seasons.
These traders export the grain purchased from FRA; hence, the grain reserve becomes a
transitional storage facility. Sometimes, FRA is also involved in government-togovernment grain export when there is a food crisis in the southern Africa region (Kuteya
& Jayne, 2012).
It is also important to note that the analysis showed that FISP has a negative
impact on grain trade as it reduces trade volumes. This finding may be further evidence
that most of the input subsidies in southern Africa are targeted to farmers who can afford
them and disfranchise smallholder farmers (Burke, Jayne, & Sitko, 2012). This targeting
may not result in the production of new stocks of grains and may displace private
investments in agriculture. In fact, Chirwa (2014) asserted that “some FISP inputs are
diverted or stolen before they reach farmers and some that farmers receive may displace
unsubsidized purchases that they would have made anyway without FISP” (p. 1). It has
also been established that “the productivity of subsidized inputs that farmers receive
depends upon the timing of input receipt, on rainfall, and on the overall management of
the crop they are applied to” (Chirwa, 2014, p. 1).
Moreover, the impact ratio for each of the two variables is < 1. According to the
input-output model, “a small change in important coefficients should have a large impact
on the output of a related sector” (Aroche & Marquez, 2012, p. 87). Therefore, these two
instruments still have a long way to go to support Zambia’s vision of having “an efficient,
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competitive, sustainable and export led agriculture sector that assures food security and
increased income by 2030” (Weitz et al., 2015, p. 9).
Political vs. Economic Equilibrium
FRA as a price stabilization instrument is aimed at rural voters. This policy
instrument is also aimed at urban voters as FRA offloads its stock to millers at lower than
its procurement cost to reduce the price of maize flour for urban consumers (Kuteya &
Jayne, 2012). FISP is also aimed at rural voters to reduce their cost of production and
sustain the adoption of improved inputs. Public spending on these two programs tends to
increase during an election year.
FRA uses price signaling to ensure that farmers focus on the type of crops the
government want to promote. Price mechanisms act as a signal for market-system actors
to decide on what to produce or purchase. However, in markets that are not competitive,
this signal becomes artificial because it does not take into consideration the market
fundamentals of supply and demand. The cost of production and consumer’s willingness
to pay become out of sync. In this situation, the farming household “separation
hypothesis” does not hold as farmers fail to use price signaling to increase their
specialization, hence ending up investing in multiple crops, including those with low or
negative return on their investments (Kien, 2010, p. 1429). However, when FRA refrains
from announcing the indicative price and quantities, private sector grain traders increase
their involvement in purchasing grain from farmers, sometimes at a higher price than that
of FRA (Cuts, 2016). In addition, grain traders pay cash to farmers immediately, whereas
FRA does not pay farmers for months (Lair, 2012).
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Limitations of the Study
The study used official grain export and import data; therefore, the flow of grain
through informal cross-border channels was not captured. This could affect the ability to
extrapolate the results to the general population of study. However, informal trade is
difficult to detect, even though it is estimated to be between 10% and 30% of the total
agricultural trade in Zambia (World Bank, 2014).
The study is valid because I used tests of stationarity and serial correlation to
ensure that the data and variables were appropriate for vector autoregression analysis,
which can also be reliably applied to other time-series datasets. Only one variable was
stationary, so I had to use deseasonalized data for the other two variables and ran the
augmented Dickey-Fuller test to enhance the analysis of stationarity. I also used Durbin
Watson to detect serial correlation.
Recommendations
Export bans and export quotas are increasingly becoming important tools in
agricultural policy for many countries in eastern and southern Africa. However, they are
applied in ad hoc fashion and last a few days or some months, given that they depend on
lobbyists’ efforts to influence “grain import tariffs and export bans for a brief time”
(Sitko & Jayne, 2011, p. 16).
To supplement this study and close other gaps in the existing literature on the
impact of agricultural policies on integrational grain trade, I recommend further research
on the optimal policy mix that promotes grain export while assuring that producers sell
their crops at or below import parity price. This recommended research would also
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determine the level of Zambian grain farmers’ competitiveness and provide a marketrelated basis for FRA pricing policy. Saverimuttu and Rempel (2004) analyzed the
determinants of grain imports and found that “a policy that increased the price farmers
receive for food crops, relative to the price received for export crops, would reduce the
need to import food” (p. 534). Import parity pricing is referred to as “a pricing policy
adopted by suppliers of a good for their sales to domestic customers according to which
price is set at the opportunity cost of a unit of an imported substitute good;” and “export
parity pricing is applied when the “price is set at the net proceeds per unit from export
sales” (Parr, 2005, p. 2).
Commenting on the calculation of parity prices, Holden (2005) suggested that
“import parity price includes the world price plus transport costs, insurance and tariffs,”
whereas “the export parity price … would be the FOB would price at the port of exit” (p.
357). This means that when domestic prices are above import parity, traders have
incentives to import. If the target good is more expensive abroad, traders have an
incentive to export.
Implications
This study has the potential to generate impact on the governance of the Zambian
agricultural sector. Using the findings of this study, government officials can rethink the
current policy mix and redesign it in a way that can lead to the vision of having “an
efficient, competitive, sustainable and export led agriculture sector that assures food
security and increased income by 2030” (Weitz et al., 2015, p. 9). An efficient and
competitive agricultural sector will not only positively impact the livelihood of the
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majority of the Zambian people, but also enhance the profitability of agribusinesses
operating in Zambia.
In practice, the ministry of agriculture can use this study and its methodology to
run multivariate time-series analysis on Zambian investments in different agriculturerelated programs. A constant use of such an analysis will inform the ministry’s allocation
of resources and ensure that more resources are channeled to high-impact areas such
postharvest management and extension.
Conclusion
Using time-series data on FISP and FRA, which constitute key agricultural policy
instruments in Zambia, this study has shown that only FRA significantly impacts grain
trade, FISP does not significantly impact grain trade, and the combined effect of these
two instruments on grain trade is significant. The study supported a recommendation that
investment in these instruments be preceded by an empirical analysis of how to positively
influence the performance of the agricultural sector and achieve its long-term vision.
Zambian agricultural leaders should use data to decide on the optimal mix of agricultural
policy that achieves political and economic equilibria.
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Appendix: Stata Syntax

1. Data summary
summarize FRA FISP Trade, separator(0)
2. Trends
twoway (tsline FRA)
twoway (tsline FISP)
twoway (tsline Trade)
twoway (tsline FRA) (tsline FISP) (tsline Trade)
3. Test for stationarity
dfuller FRA, trend lags(1)
dfuller FISP, trend lags(1)

dfuller Trade, trend lags(1)
4. Test for serial correlation
tsset Year
regress Trade FRA FISP
estat dwatson
regress Trade FRA FISP, noconstant tsscons
prais Trade FRA FISP, rhotype (regress)
5. Vector autoregression analysis
var Trade, lags(1/1) exog(FRA)
var Trade, lags(1/1) exog(FISP)
var Trade, lags(1/1) exog(FRA FISP)
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var Trade, lags(1/1) exog(logFRA logFISP logFRA_FISP )

6. Forecasting
var Trade, lags(1/1) exog(FRA FISP)
fcast compute y1_FRA y1_FISP, step(18)
fcast graph

